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INTRABLOC

Press Conference of Polish Envoy to Romania *AU042109 Bucharest AGERPRES in English* 1800 GMT 4 Dec 87

[Text] Polish Embassy Press Conference—On December 4 Boguslaw Stachura, Poland's ambassador in Bucharest, organized a press conference during which the main current lines of Poland's economic and social development were presented, at the embassy. Representatives of the central press, the Romanian news agency, the radio-television and foreign press correspondents accredited in Bucharest participated.

0411

POLAND

PRON Supports Election 'Democratization,' Nomination Changes *26000040b Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish* 6 Oct 87 pp 1, 3

[Article by Izabella Czaplarska: "The Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth for Further Democratization of Election Laws"]

[Text] We have hardly looked around and the end of the current term in office of the national councils is approaching. The term ends in June of next year. The organizer and sponsor of the elections will again be the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth. Without wasting time the Movement has taken up the issue of changes in the election rules and declared its support for their further democratization. In July 1987 the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the National Council of the Movement named a group which is to prepare proposed changes in the election law.

The Movement's opinion on this shape is not new. The first recommendations for changes were originally voiced by the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the National Council of the Movement almost immediately after the last elections. Next in its "Position on the Problems of the Development of Poland," the Second Congress of the Movement voiced the opinion: "reforming the method of selecting local representative bodies could and should be made more rapidly and completely."

Notice the Most Worthwhile

Now too, in naming the special group to prepare the revision in the election law, the Movement has decisively supported its more complete democratization. It proceeds here on the assumption, and this position derives also from the judgment of the party, that the increasingly stable socio-political situation in Poland makes it possible to deepen the process of popular authority. One of the most essential elements of this process is the shape of the civic election act. The object of the analysis of the

group and its proposals for possible changes will be, among other things, the procedure for selecting the candidates, which is very critical for the elections themselves.

The Movement also sees a role for itself in selecting the candidates: on it will largely depend (among other bodies authorized to submit candidates) whether it notices the appropriate people in the community, especially the unaffiliated, worthwhile, active individuals who may not have previously been sufficiently well known or popular among wider groups of people. We ought to wish the Movement that it recover the freshness of its reactions and openness toward new people or social groups during the electoral campaign. Another no less important issue is associated with the issue of the way candidates are selected: retain the preference places on the list or discard them? In the "Position on the Problems of the Development of Poland" at the Second Congress, the view was clearly expressed on the issues formulated among others in the numerous discussions and proposals: it is essential "to create for citizens the full opportunity to propose and judge candidates at pre-election meetings, to create for the voters the opportunity to choose among several candidates nominated on an equal basis, without legal preferences."

Thus, it postulates resignation from the mandated positions. The adoption of such premises along with others, for example, introducing the obligation of secrecy in the election act (thus not the right to vote in a booth but the obligation) are questions on which work is continuing. If the proposed plans for changes are accepted, after discussion, by the National Council of the Movement in November and December 1987 as is anticipated, the Movement will conduct a broad social consultation on the subject. Not just an "Accounting" One of the essential tasks of the Movement in the election campaign will be the creation of conditions at meetings with the voters to make possible an accounting of the local authorities and administration's implementation of the electoral programs adopted during previous terms of office. This is not just a question of the credibility of the actions of the authorities and almost "coincidentally" of the Movement which will carry its weight with the voters' judgment.

It is also a forum where against the background of the concrete achievements the best, the most active council members should come to light and justify their repeated candidacy. The evaluation of the activities of the councils and councilors during the term is also one of the most important aspects of the audit of the representative and administrative bodies by the voters.

The Movement will be the organizer and sponsor of the meeting with the voters at which the results of the past term, the execution of the election programs, and other undertakings, which, for example, the successive undertakings independent of the programs, will be discussed. There are many places in Poland where during the last 4

years schools, store pavilions, cultural centers, road networks, or water lines, and other actions, not included in the programs, were built or expanded.

The actions of these city residents, their representative and administrative bodies are apparent in the results of the annual competitions "Master of Management." There is no shortage of towns and villages, for example, which have again confirmed the saying that we have the best programs in the world, but their implementation is much worse.

Conditions for Independence

This is not a question of narrow accounting—assets, deficits. The Movement intends in this election campaign to stimulate a significantly broader discussion on the actions of the national councils during the current term in office and together with the residents to analyze the conditions under which the councils functioned. Were the opportunities which the law on the system of national councils and local self-governments opened up used? Did the national councils at higher levels and administration transfer the appropriate rights to the councils at the basic level ensuring them the necessary conditions for independence? And above all: Are there sufficient financial foundations for the independence of the local representative bodies and do the councils want and are they capable of taking advantage of their rights? The coming election campaign then is not just to broaden the democratic changes in the election law creating the conditions for citizens completely expressing themselves in the election act. The law should also teach in practice how to take advantage of the actually existing rights and opportunities for full exercise of people's authority.

13021

OPZZ Official Seeks Greater Role in Legislative Process

26000040a Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish
8 Oct 87 p 4

[Interview with Stanislaw Bar, deputy chairman of the All Polish Convention of Trade Unions, by PAP correspondent Piotr Moczar: "Five Years of the Trade Union Law"; first paragraph introduction]

[Text] Five years ago, on 8 October 1987, the Sejm passed the trade union law. A PAP correspondent interviewed Stanislaw Bar, deputy chairman of the All Polish Convention of Trade Unions, on this subject. Among other things he commented: "Passing the new law on trade unions made it possible to rebuild the trade union movement in a new organizational form with new accents. Giving the plant organizations full rights was an innovation which deserves particular emphasis." The document also clearly and explicitly establishes the position of the trade union movement with respect to the state and economic administrations. "This does not

mean, however, that we should not strive for further improvement of the law. We believe, for example, that the trade unions should have more influence on legislative processes, should increase their role and responsibility for managing the state." "The fact that the union movement in Poland rose from the bottom favors the control that the plant organizations exercise on the higher levels. This is an important element in the democratization of the union movement." "In closing I must say that in spite of some claims we are absolutely against weakening the functions of the workers' self-managements. We are, however, interested in the health of these self-managements which also represent the interests of the working people."

13021

Sociologist on Needed Changes in Attitudes Toward Reform

26000061a Warsaw *ZYCIE WARSZAWY* in Polish
10-11 Oct 87 p 4

[Interview with Professor Wladyslaw Adamski, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, PAN, by Alicja Matynia-Bonik: "Insofar as We Can Afford It"]

[Text] [Question] Professor, sir, within the Polish society pro-reform attitudes and aspirations are becoming strengthened, but at the same time a mood of impatience and discontent with the changes occurring in precisely that direction is being sensed. Properly speaking, who is waiting for these changes and who dreads them and why?

[Answer] Apprehensions and impatience are felt by both sides, both by those who in the present conditions decide on the course of the changes, that is, by the authorities, and by a large segment of the society. The apprehensions stem from experience. Potential innovators or supporters of change remember from experience or from hearsay that many unsuccessful attempts at reform have already been made in the past. At the same time, certain representatives of the authorities who are decisive to the process of change may still feel traumatized by the period during which elemental pressure in favor of various reforms had been regarded as a threat to not only the interests of privileged groups but also the stability of the system.

Let me refer to the findings of polls from the series "Poles in the 1980's," which I am directing. We have reached the definite conclusion (findings for 1984) that those who are most interested in the changes yielding improved economic performance and a broader participation of citizens in governance and management entertain at the same time a critical view of the authorities. In their turn, those who are free of such prejudice and rather inclined to support the authorities have more reservations and feel more apprehensive about the reform. As can be guessed, they fear that changes can

harbor the risk of a worsening of the present situation or the loss of certain privileges that are not necessarily linked to work performance.

[Question] It appears that an increase in output will be decisive to the success of the reform. Hence, attention should be principally focused on eliminating the barriers and impediments to that increase. Yet, the issue of greatest concern to the public continues to be the distribution of goods in the name of so-called social justice. Everyone is affected by this issue. As a result, attention is being focused on distribution rather than on production. Is not this closing a vicious circle?

[Answer] Aspirations in the nature of demands have arisen in our society, that is, it has become markedly sensitized to "what is due whom." We observe this attitude in every social stratum, not just in the strata structurally located closest to the authorities, that is, among administrators, officialdom, and influential circles, but also among the basic social strata. Aspirations in the nature of demands have been reflected not only in the conduct of society in the early 1980's, in the form of the social protest of workers in general, but also, in particular, as we have deduced from the polls, among workers in relatively unskilled categories. For this tendency is linked to the deeply rooted belief that in this society, in this social system, everyone should receive an equal share, regardless of his work performance. Underlying this mentality is what is termed the achievement of our system of society, namely, the feeling of an elementary social security regardless of one's work performance. This is a kind of social conservatism which expresses itself precisely in rejection of any change owing to the apprehension that then things would get worse.

Thus there has arisen an alliance of forces which have something to lose, on the assumption that it is enough for the state to apportion equally everything that is produced. So long as the state had something to apportion, and so long as social expectations and aspirations basically did not outpace the possibilities of the economy, this principle remained feasible. But already toward the end of the 1960's there appeared initial symptoms and signals of a dissonance between social expectations and the possibilities for satisfying them.

The sources of the Polish crisis are traceable to not only the "voluntarisms" and "subjectivisms" of the ruling teams but also and definitely to the alignment of forces between the rulers and the ruled, and especially the dissonance between the growing aspirations in the nature of demands unrelated to individual and collective work performance and the possibilities for meeting these demands. In this sense, a role in generating the crisis or creating the premises for it was played not only by the rulers but also by a system which led to apathy and weakening of the feeling of social responsibility among the ruled. I refer here especially to militant key-industry workers who won for themselves the power of blocking the measures of the authorities [by inflationary wage

demands] while at the same time lacking the conditions for achieving their personal aspirations in terms of the expected higher productivity and greater political effectiveness.

[Question] The "top" has done much to promote the reform. But at the same time it is being accused of lack of consistency on this path. Is this not the most serious obstacle to the reform?

[Answer] If we now try to identify the champions and opponents of the reform, which would make our social and economic system more productive, the formal-legal aspects of the reform, on which the Sejm is working so diligently for the second term of its office in turn, should be not the only aspects to be changed. At the same time, there is growing impatience among both the authorities and the society because the new pro-reform laws meet with such feeble social resonance. The reform requires changes and sacrifices from both sides—from the authorities and the society—which are entangled in bargaining about the distribution or production of the proverbial loaf of bread [national income]. Not only those who already have work and access to basic conditions of existence need to feel secure but also those whom we term reformers, innovators, or bearers of that initiative for which everyone is clamoring.

In suburban localities around Warsaw we can see many newly built summer cottages, often on a scale incommensurate with the needs of their owners. Yet at the same time, then and now, there is an evident shortage of cement and other materials for housing construction. This suggests that the proprietors of these cottages, or at least a large part of them, would not spend their surplus incomes in such a socially inutile manner were they enabled to invest their surplus cash in some productive enterprise. For while on the one hand private initiative is being encouraged, on the other there exist apprehensions about the rebirth of capitalism and excessive self-enrichment. In our conditions the capitalist threat is hardly realistic. It is a pity though that private initiative in Poland is so distant from what is healthy among capitalist entrepreneurs, namely, from the ethos of thrift, self-sacrifice, and accumulation of capital for future generations. In this country everything is being done for the present moment, in a mood of uncertainty due to constantly changing regulations. In my opinion, any initiative, not only private but in the socialized sector, is meeting with barriers. Laws alone will not resolve everything. What is needed is some convincing proof that [such initiative] will pay and is a more permanent rather than an interim solution.

[Question] How can natural human egotism be exploited for the sake of the interest of the entire society? How can social will for growth be released, how can a bridge be built between egotism and social interest?

[Answer] In exploring the sources of the crisis or conflict situations I reach the conclusion that a still underestimated premise for these occurrences was the generational change that took place in the 1970's, that mass appearance of educated people with new aspirations which collided with the limitations on the unfolding of initiative in socialized industry or institutions. This was a source of embitterment and rebelliousness, which led to protests and dissent, and which still exists.

A change in the attitude toward the rising generation should be commenced by adopting a model of socio-occupational adaptation different from that currently binding. It cannot be assumed that it is the duty of the young engineer to adapt himself completely to the expectations of his workplace. We are in a situation in which selective adaptation, a model of dynamic and selective adaptation, should be the obligation and realistic duty of the young. The young employee should have the opportunity of not just adapting himself the existing labor relations but also changing them by opposing the individuals who, in the name of conservatism and narrow group interests, reject change.

At one time much has been said about the educational functions of the workplace. However, socialist pedagogy has stayed in the realm of theory. At the present, many socialist countries, such as Hungary, are trying to link the employee to the workplace by letting him hold shares in the enterprise or share in its profits rather than by paying him a wage alone. As regards the strategy to be followed in order to promote social change, more attention should be paid to the current trend, which is what you term the bridge between egotism and social interest, that is, conditions should be provided for meeting individual and social needs, and the aspirations of enterprising individuals should be linked to collective interest.

[Question] What conditions should be met to that end?

[Answer] This requires mutual trust between both sides—employer and employee or, more broadly, between the authorities and the citizens. What is needed is a modicum of [public] confidence that we are making new rules of the game and that these rules will be followed. The authorities must gain a modicum of social trust at the price of abandoning aspirations—illusory, besides—toward supervising and monitoring everything and everyone, by broadening the domain of initiative, in accordance with the principle, "what is not explicitly forbidden, is allowed." This is the price that must be paid for harnessing that egotism into certain channels, because otherwise that egotism will manifest itself in socially pathological ways.

[Question] It seems to me that lawyers, physiologists, and sociologists should once again rethink the problem of property in a socialist economy and society.

[Answer] In the light of the experience of recent decades, one effect of not only nationalization but also bureaucratization of control over property has been a far-reaching apathy of many social groups, families, and individuals. And an apathetic society lacks the feeling of responsibility. In our conditions, fears of a rebirth of capitalism are not unjustified. Even in the years 1980-1981 there had been no attempts by peasants to divide up state farms, and nobody advocated reprivatizing the factories.

We need not so much a redefinition of the concept of ownership as enhancing the social standing of organizers of big projects, regardless of the form they take—state projects, group projects, or individual projects. What we need is a symbiosis of big and little initiatives. Throughout the modern world it is the diversity of the forms and methods of ownership and power that assures the most dynamic development.

Behind every success there stand exceptional characters and individuals. But if such exceptional talents are to produce equally imposing effects, they must be provided, as in big-time athletics, with above-average conditions for their operation. We have an opening for the successful entrepreneur, manager, or representative of a creative group of interests. Society must become aware of this need. This requires not only providing the right legal premises but also a new nature of social relations as determined by the attitude of the authorities and their relationship to autonomous social groups. An institutional reform promoting this goal should be accompanied by a reform of social awareness. For if we adopt new rules of the game, this will not produce effects immediately—it will take several solid years for them to appear. An authentic renewal of this country can take place only in the presence of collective efforts and sacrifices which should be borne jointly by the authorities and the society. I call this deferred gratification. As for the question of how long a moratorium of this kind we can afford, that is another matter.

We still suffer a shortage of constructive thinking and action and a surfeit of their negative counterparts. This may ensue from the unequal alignment of forces between the social capital invested in the blocking institutions and the shortage of positions and posts responsible for creative initiative and unblocking. In such a situation, the sacrifices referred to above on the part of the authorities, institutions, and the administration must entail, among other things, subjection to more effective public control, that is also the exploration of forms of such control that are not mere lip service such as it has been for decades.

Reform Depends on Personnel Policy, More Local Authority

26000063e Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
23 Oct 87 p 1

[Article by Anna Pawlowska: "Questions on Reform"]

[Text] If we are to be consistent and determined this time, we should also resolve the personnel situation in a revolutionary way, said my caller, an engineer from Warsaw, citing his 40-year party tenure. The proposal he offered really was revolutionary: dismissing all enterprise directors from their posts and announcing competitions to fill those positions with new people.

Why? Well, in the engineer's opinion, those who now manage plants are unable to switch over to the new way of thinking and action and because of them the second stage of reform "will run aground again." In addition, he says, citing his experience, in every firm there are many people better prepared and smarter than their bosses; the road should be opened to them in the first place. In the premises of the competition it would be necessary to remove the present barrier (at least five years of work experience is required for management positions) which shuts off the possibility of participation to young people, even the best graduates of higher schools.

I am concerned about the fate of reform, said my caller, since I have noticed that increased independence in the hands of current managers is reduced to increased pursuit of private interests. I am of the opinion that it would even be worth compensating them for their attained personal advantages, if only to open a field of action to another kind of people.

Strongly spoken. But fairly? I must admit my caller was right in that the success of reform depends to a great extent on the quality of management personnel, especially in director positions in industry. I also agree with him that some of these personnel will be unable to cope with new demands and new opportunities. I begin to take issue at the point where the engineer generalizes, extending this opinion to everyone without exception. Because it is also true that scores if not hundreds of the representatives of these personnel have up to now been limited in their initiative, inventiveness and striving for change. At least I have heard sigh like this scores of times: "If they would not interfere." Well now, if all goes well, no one will interfere with them. So let them show what they can do. If it turns out to be not much, then, comrade engineer, personnel policy should move in with all diligence since in its current form it has a completely adequate number of mechanisms for cleaning up the field.

It is probably not a coincidence that the newspaper's telephone conversations devoted to the question of the party in the second stage of reform generally came back to personnel policy. A comrade from Kalisz (a bank employee) said that, in her opinion, an increase in a

firm's independence will surely diminish the standing of weak, timid party organizations that merely wait for directives, while organizations that truly abide by the criteria of party membership will be strengthened and win new opportunities for affecting plant reality. Would we be worthy, she asked, if we were to be afraid of such a test?

This comrade also assesses favorably the proposal to give full local authority to the people's councils. Currently, she said, our party councillors do more intervening in the most scandalous matters than participating in government; everyone knows that in practice the city or gmina offices govern. It is only now that it will be truly important what kind of people—politically, morally and as regards character—we will recommend as councillors. And the influence the party wins on the future of a city or gmina will depend on these recommendations.

I also got a question on whether the party, in appealing to others to decrease non-productive employment, intends to apply similar proposals to itself. I respond: It has already applied them; the party apparatus has been subjected to a 20 percent reduction. But that is not the most important. The fundamental proposal concerns the style of work of that apparatus, taking it away from desks and conferences and sending it out among the people, into ordinary, real life. And this is also taking place, naturally not with an equally favorable result always and everywhere. But the party, which as the comrade from Kalisz said aptly, cannot be afraid of the test through which its basic units will pass, must subject its own political personnel to an even stricter test. It is doing this and will continue to do it.

12776

Warsaw Citizens Advisory Caucus Formed, Members Listed

26000055a Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
21 Oct 87 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Warsaw Civic Consultative Body"]

[Text] The Bureau of the Warsaw National Council announced that the inaugural meeting of the Civic Consultative Body at the city hall.

Its members are widely recognized individuals invited by the chair of the Warsaw National Council to consider the issues that concern the whole populace or specific groups. Thus among the individuals who have accepted this role there are experienced specialists who have broad knowledge and varied points of view. They are known for their penetrating judgments and the courage to express their views, and their involvement in the affairs of the city and voivodship.

What forms of operation and what subjects will the Civic Consultative Body take up? We know already that neither the precise form of operation nor the problems to be taken up can be designated in advance.

The first meeting of the body produced a free, frequently controversial exchange of views, observations, and suggestions on subjects associated among others with the problems of the operation of the administration, the development of various forms of self-government, and social policy, including the difficult situation in which many groups of people find themselves.

A number of subjects were taken up that require study and discussion.

The Body consists of Jerzy Albrecht, retired, former president of Warsaw, PZPR; Henryk Baluch, professor, director of the National Research and Development Center for Railroad System Engineering, PZPR; Leslaw Bartelski, writer, civic activist, unaffiliated; Antoni Jerzy Chacinski, secretary of the Warsaw Charities Society, lawyer, unaffiliated; Antoni Demczyk, deputy director of the self-government group at the Provincial Union of Farmers and Agricultural Circles and Organizations, ZSL; Juliusz Gomulicki, writer editor, retired professor, unaffiliated; Barbara Hoff, fashion designer, journalist, unaffiliated; Jerzy Janicki, writer, journalist, unaffiliated; Stanislaw Karolkiewicz, activist of the Pax Society, director of the Fund for the Protection of Monuments, unaffiliated; Jozef Kosecki, sociologist, activist of the political organization Grunwald, PZPR; Andrzej Kosso-budzki-Orlowski, journalist for ZA I PRZECIW, Christian Social Association; Kazimierz Laskowski, private farmer, ZSL; Krzysztof Lewandowski, journalist for KURIER POLSKI, SD; Adam Polanowski, student at Warsaw University, PRON activist, PZPR; Igor Timofiejuk, economist, professor at Warsaw University, PZPR; Tadeusz Ulatowski, professor at the Physical Education Academy, unaffiliated; Roman Wionczek, film director, unaffiliated; Leszek Wyszynacki, editor-in-chief of STOLICA, PZPR; Janusz Zarzycki, Gen. Div. Retired, former chairman of the Presidium of the Warsaw National Council, PZPR.

13021

Gdansk PZPR Committee on Winter Preparations, Organizational Tasks

26000055c Gdansk *DZIENNIK BALTYCKI* in Polish
1 Oct 87 p 2

[Report: "Work of the Executive of the PZPR Gdansk Voivodship Committee: Evaluation of Voivodship Party Organization, Preparations and Supplies for Winter"]

[Excerpts] Yesterday the Executive of the PZPR Gdansk Voivodship Committee heard evaluations of the effectiveness of the work done by voivodship party organization during the first half of 1987.

It was emphasized that the system of self-evaluation introduced is becoming an important element stimulating the activeness of all of the party structures, making possible a more realistic evaluation of the existing situation, of the distribution of party forces, and of the actual opportunities for effective action. As a result of broad discussion recommendations were formulated that will be used in the materials being prepared for presentation at the next plenum of the voivodship committee.

The Executive evaluated the work of the public services for winter.

The Executive's concern was aroused by insufficient opportunities for making organizational changes, the insignificant progress in maintenance in the corroding heating network and repairs to roofs, and the planned reduction in snow removal from roads.

The Executive required party organizations and administrative bodies to make evaluations of the preparations for winter within the next month.

The Executive accepted the statement by those directing the winter preparations that there are no other delays in maintenance on boilers and heating networks than those mentioned during the meeting threatening the effective implementation of the present plans.

Implementation of the recommendations of the Executive of the PZPR Voivodship Committee of 24 April 1987 on the operation and promotion of the influence of GLOS WYBRZEZA was evaluated. The Executive judged that recently the work of the editors of GLOS WYBRZEZA had made a series of positive changes, especially in the promotion of party policy, presenting the achievements of the voivodship, and deepening its contacts with the readers.

The Executive heard reports on the subject of the planned supplies in the voivodship for the fourth quarter of 1987 and supplies of coal and fruit for winter. It expressed concern over the deepening shortage of some goods, recommending that the appropriate services make every effort possible to ameliorate the market shortages.

13021

Voivodship Prosecutors on Civil Rights, Crime Prevention

26000063b Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish
23 Oct 87 p 2

[Text] A conference of provincial prosecutors devoted to assessing the implementation of goals outlined in the plan of action for the prosecutor's office for 1987 was

held on 22 October. An evaluation was made of prosecuting bodies' fulfillment of goals in the fields of safeguarding law and order and insuring respect for civil rights, confirming the high level of work activity and further opportunities to attain socially desired results.

This applies to increasing the efficiency of preventing and fighting the most serious crimes and verifying compliance with the law by administrative bodies. Actions thus far by the prosecutor's office comprise its important contribution to developing the front for the fight against social ills, against all manifestations of social pathology, especially alcoholism, parasitism and drug abuse. The prosecutors' role of compliance with the law and their responsibilities during the institution of the second stage of economic reform were also emphasized.

Prosecutor General Jozef Zyta chaired the conference.

12776

Poznan PZPR Plenum Notes Slow Growth Among Youth, POP Activities

26000057a Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in Polish
1 Oct 87 pp 1,4

[Articles by Marian Lucki et al.: "To Be at the Center of Human Affairs: Jozef Baryla at the Poznan Voivodship PZPR Committee Plenum"]

[Text] The membership of the Poznan voivodship party organization increased by 423 persons during the first half of 1987; as of 30 June it consisted of 86,600 members and candidate members. To be sure, during that half-year the basic party organizations admitted 1,506 candidate members, but many continue to quit the party. Of the newly admitted members, workers accounted for 47.3 percent, and peasants, 9 percent of whom 38.8 percent are youth up to 29 years old.

These figures were presented yesterday to participants in the plenary meeting of the PZPR voivodship committee by its secretary Andrzej Rakowski. In addition to voivodship committee members, the meeting was attended by invited secretaries of plant and basic party organizations (POP's), Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryla, Candidate Member of the Politburo Gabriela Rembisz, and Professor Adam Lopatka, chief justice of the Supreme Court.

A. Rakowski, who on behalf of the Executive Board of the PZPR Voivodship Committee presented a nearly hourlong prefatory address for discussion, first focused on the most important issue to the party—the expansion of party ranks. He declared that during the first half of this year that expansion took place at 57 basic-level party echelons, which in the Poznan Voivodship total 66, and that there exist POP's which have not admitted even one new member for 3 years.

Here it should be bluntly asked why is this situation tolerated by basic-level party echelons and whether and how have they attempted to come to the aid of these organizations? Why has that aid proved ineffective?

The new candidate members include relatively few young people below 30 years old, and the situation is worsened by the fact that youth accounts for 6.3 percent of the membership of the voivodship party organization. It turns out that those ZSMP [Union of Polish Socialist Youth] circles which have the right to recommend their members for membership in the party can hardly be counted upon. There are 246 such circles in Poznan Voivodship, yet during the first half of the year they recommended to the party barely 40 persons. A. Rakowski moreover discussed the causes of the poor performance of a number of POP's, mentioning, among other things, passivity in executing the powers ensuing from the principles of personnel policy.

Outlining the tasks facing the basic party organizations as regards applying the economic reform, he highlighted three tasks: overcoming the barriers of insufficient knowledge by the workforces and limited or only seeming commitment of certain managers to the economic streamlining of enterprises, applying the goals and mechanisms of the reform to plants and workstations; and combatting any pathology, especially in the domain of economics.

In conclusion, he stated, "All our activities should promote the full implementation of the resolutions of the 10th PZPR Congress as regards enhancing internal strength and perfecting the performance of all party elements, especially POP's."

This was followed by plenary discussion, which was chaired by First Secretary of the Poznan Voivodship PZPR Committee Edward Lukasik, who gave the floor to six persons—all who had asked for it. Much attention in the discussion was devoted to youth in the party. The battle for the rising generation, Michal Iwaszkiewicz stated, can produce results in the long run if a coherent indoctrination system is created. This struggle is being waged on many planes, and in every case the role of the POP is difficult to overestimate with respect to its influence on the family, the school, youth organizations, informal groups, and broadly conceived process of upbringing.

Valuable comments on the role of the POP were made by Antoni Szczucinski who drew attention to the growing uncertainty of PZPR members about the fate of the party and the position of its basic elements in connection with the changes taking place in this country. He asked, how can an uncompromising implementation of the program for democratization be reconciled with an uncompromising attitude toward the fundamental question—the party's retention of political leadership in this country? The speaker observed in this connection that one of the barriers to the growth and strengthening of the POP's is

the fear that the party's reins over politics might be loosened. This thesis, which is debatable to say the least, has not however been commented upon in the subsequent course of the plenary discussions, and neither has the interesting observation that, instead of memorizing the dates of the successive crises, attention should be paid to the periods "in between," the more so considering that more than 7 years have elapsed since the last outbreak of social discontent, whereas it was the happenings during each of these intervening periods that were the causes of the successive crises.

During a break in the plenary deliberations, discussion continued within seven taskforces. Below are accounts by our reporters on that discussion.

Improving the Style and Methods of Work of the POP
(reported by Marian Lucki):

This taskforce was chaired by Voivodship Committee Secretary A. Rakowski. Eight persons took the floor during the discussion. The experience of basic and section party organizations and party groups was exchanged. Instances of actions promoting the quantitative and qualitative growth of membership were presented. At the same time, unsatisfactory performance by still many party organizations, especially in the countryside, was pointed out.

It was stressed that the work of basic party elements is still marked by considerable formalism and absence of substantive action. Hence, links among comrades are also needed at their domiciles, where party work reduces to the activity of comrades who are senior in age. Here, support by plants and by the activists once employed there is lacking.

Apprehensions about the aging of party membership were voiced. Unless there is greater influx of youth to the party, the danger of the so-called "generation gap" may appear. In party work with youth the resolutions of the Ninth PZPR Central Committee Plenum are not being implemented. In the opinion of youth, it lacks that steady ally which the POP's should be. It was concluded that talks should be held in the immediate future with the party members belonging to youth organizations.

Attention was also drawn to the role of the POP secretary. His work is good if there is cooperation with all comrades and nonparty activists. It was also stressed that the leading role of the POP cannot reduce to the proactivity of the POP secretary alone, instead of the broad aktiv.

Party tasks also were discussed. It was stressed that assignment of substantive and specific tasks combined with periodic evaluations of their fulfillment can not only expedite the solution of problems but also enhance the effectiveness of party work and have a disciplining and educational influence on the attitudes and conduct of party members.

In addition, the necessity of revolutionary economic changes was supported. Positive changes will spur the performance of the POP's and the proactivism of discrete party members and candidate members. At the same time, the fear was expressed that in a situation in which economic and ideological-political consolidation is missing, the struggle to defend the principles of our system of society may become exacerbated. It was also emphasized that the tried and tested methods of POP work should be more boldly applied.

POP—Attitudes and Ideology (reported by Wieslaw Kandziora)

To what extent does the society accept the assumptions of party policy, and what role should the party organization play in propagating that policy? Do basic PZPR elements dispose of instruments of ideological and political influence, and if yes, where should the flaws in the day-by-day operation of these instruments be explored? Should the reasons for the low "demand" for ideology be always and everywhere traced to the country's difficult economic situation, or are perhaps the effectiveness of training, knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, and desire to apply in practice the program assumptions of the party, dependent on other and no less important factors such as the level of ideological work and effort or the weakness, conservatism, and limited influence of the POP's themselves?

Quite a few difficult and sometimes sensitive problems confronted yesterday the members of the taskforce discussing under the chairmanship of PZPR Voivodship Committee Secretary Jerzy Silski the problems involved in shaping the attitudes of party members and the role of the POP in the ideological life of the community and the workplace.

The facts cited by the various discussants spoke for themselves, besides: why is it that at the Piast Housing Project in Poznan barely a few dozen flags appear on state and party holidays, although nearly 1,500 party members are known to be tenants at that project? Why is a retired army major accusing a party organization of neglect of statutory duties, because, instead of deleting his name from membership rolls following failure to pay dues for 3 months, it continues to "bother" him with letters and summons to TOP [local party organization] meetings?

One of the POP secretaries invited to the plenum declared, "We conduct training; we meet several times monthly, but the results of our work are incommensurate with the efforts."

Another speaker pointed out, "At our workplaces we are good party members, but once we return home we forget both the ideology and our obligations to the PZPR."

"We fear to speak up and to act, although justice and social support are on our side. Why? Why do we fear risking our own skin for the idea which we should serve?"

Quite a few examples of situations in which precisely the low awareness and "fears" of party members impede the democratization of life were mentioned, but counter-measures also were explored: methods of ideological influence should be adapted to practice; there should be less formalism and more commitment, fewer apprehensions and greater militancy in the struggle against evil.

For this too is ideology, it was emphasized, and this is the most difficult ideology. What about existence? Of course, it shapes awareness. But awareness also is shaped by empty store shelves, prices and wages, prospects, and possibilities—by our lives, individual and collective. Wherever such life is becoming too difficult, it is particularly easy to blame ideology for it—precisely ideology and not the shortcomings in translating it into reality—shortcomings that after all are, as pointed out by one discussant, due to the individual himself, to the member of the basic party organization.

The POP in the Socialist Workplace (reported by Janusz Truszczyński)

For a long time now we have become accustomed to asking questions. Of course, questions are needed and demonstrate the desire to explore optimal solutions, but, as in any other case, we should not overdo it. What is also needed is answers, and these are contained in the implementation of the adopted plan of action. Real life is thus its test. This was mentioned by Stefan Antkowiak, first secretary of the plant party committee at the Poznan ZNTK [Railroad Rolling Stock Repair Shops], who illustrated his thesis with extensive conclusions ensuing from the job certification and review of organizational structures conducted at his plant.

He declared, "This will bring us fruitful results if the supply of producer goods improves instead of deteriorating. This concerns poor balancing of the plan for industrial plants at the central level. In addition, we find that the wages of all ZNTK employees are dangerously declining compared with the wages paid by cooperatives and private firms."

Job certification is unambiguously linked to personnel policy. This precisely was the topic that dominated the deliberations of the Third Taskforce, chaired by Voivodship Committee Secretary Stanislaw Piotrowicz. Nearly every discussant stressed mightily the need to for the advancement of young, ambitious, daring, committed, and highly qualified employees. Such people are everywhere and all that is needed is to know how to find them in order to meet a fundamental requirement for party organizations in the socialist workplace.

The decision to grant promotion is not merely a formal-organizational measure. It also has an important social and psychological dimension. Reasoned and deeply motivated promotions can serve us to win over valuable and authoritative members of the workforce. Irrational advancement, on the other hand, may be a source of injustice. For a person who fails to prove himself in his new post this can mean a personal defeat that is pregnant in painful consequences. Thus, in no case should the place and role of the POP be reduced to the mere acceptance of personnel decisions taken at the top.

The discussion of the tasks of the factory party organization was enriched by interesting comments of First Secretary of the Poznan-Jezyce Borough PZPR Committee Ryszard Tomaszewski. They concerned the near and the distant future, namely, the implementation of the second stage of the economic reform. The need to augment supply [of consumer goods], to strengthen the zloty, and to revamp social and production structures is engendering new problems facing all party members. These problems will require iron consistency of action (which, incidentally, will not be to the taste of everybody) and ability to cope with social situations that may sometimes be surprising. It would be good to anticipate such situations in accordance with the requirements of party-mindedness. At the end of the truly revolutionary road of development taken, there should be room for a healthy socialist economy.

The Party's Tasks in the Countryside (reported by Marian Trojak)

In the Poznan countryside operate 966 party organizations with a combined total of nearly 22,000 members and candidate members of the PZPR. Their problems and the forms and methods of party work in the rural community were the subject of a meeting of Taskforce Four chaired by Secretary of the Poznan Voivodship PZPR Committee Zygmunt Kyc.

The discussion touched upon the nature of the public consultations organized prior to the plenum, on stressing the special importance of party work among tenants. Wherever most of the members and candidate members of the PZPR belong to the party organization at their workplace, there remains a minority which cannot always be used to establish local [tenant] party organizations. In Duszniki Gmina, for example, that minority participates in the work of plant POP's, is assigned tasks continent on place of domicile, and receives varied assistance from party echelons.

Many speakers pointed to problems of recruiting new party members, especially among private farmers. Even open party meetings do not help. Farmers view the party's work through the prism of the problems it helps or does not help them solve, and the generation of farmers in their 30's lacks the time for public activity. In

this context, the personality of the first party secretary, his ability to work with people and be persuasive at the form of the village council or other self-government body matters highly.

Much was also said about the rural intelligentsia, whose potential for stimulating proactivism is being inadequately utilized. On the one hand, this group of people serves as "whipping boys" who have to justify sins which they had not committed themselves and decisions which they did not take personally. On the other, it was pointed out that certain so-called party mentors treat these activities too formally, evaluating the organizations on the basis of quantitative indicators rather than from the standpoint of proactivism within the community. It was proposed that the performance of the mentors, too, be periodically evaluated.

The future of party organizations in the countryside was thought to lie in their opening to youth. It was suggested that the POP's in elementary and ministerial schools cooperate with party organizations at the patron plants and enterprises which organize work internships. It was stated that the measures taken so far on behalf of youth are of a desultory and relatively non-innovative nature.

Numerous comments were made, however, to the effect that recently the opinions of the rural community about the party have been changing to its advantage. Nevertheless, the existing problems with the supply of farm producer goods and staple consumer goods do not provide favorable premises for political work. Hence, it was also postulated that the resolution to be adopted should stress support for the normal and efficient performance of those non-agricultural elements which tremendously influence the functioning of the entire food industry.

The POP's in the Scientific, Educational, and Cultural Communities (reported by Bogna Wojciechowska)

The secretaries of basic party organizations lack skill in finding their niche within the power structure of the work establishment. This conclusion was drawn during the discussion of the situation in science, education, and culture. This problem is particularly evident in artistic institutions, where the director not only decides on everything but, as Wojciech Spaleniak stated, places a personal imprint on the nature and artistic profile of his institution. What, for example, is the relationship between the quality of the theatre program, which is drafted by the director, and the POP secretary? It helps if the secretary is a good actor. Besides, a similar situation exists at institutions of higher education where the POP secretary as an adjunct professor has a full professor for his partner. Is he really the partner of that full professor? Conclusion: the best people should be elected POP secretaries (with respect to the educational system, Jadwiga Kosmider offered the recommendation that the secretary should be a role model), and it should be a most urgent task for higher party echelons to make

secretaries aware of their role in the basic party organizations within which they work (J. Kosmider even proposed a form of applied training) and to support the authority of the POP by, for example, dispatching representatives of these echelons to talk with the party secretary first rather than with the director about the actual problems of these institutions.

Talking about the importance and authority of the POP as a whole and the authority of its secretary is merely paying lip service, considering that administrators take decisions without bothering to consult the POP. Instances of disregard of the POP when selecting candidates for school administrators or taking personnel decisions at research institutions were mentioned. St. Klama commented that if a party organization lacks influence on the allocation of resources for scientific research, then it likewise lacks any influence on the directions of research and, as a result, its role within the academic community is limited.

In the opinion of Zdzislaw Kolaczyk, we discuss what we expect of the POP's without naming the addressees of these expectations—who are "we"? The community? The party echelon? Unless this question is answered, unless the relationship between the POP and the higher party echelon is defined more precisely, we shall continue to administer basic party organizations in the old manner, without allowance for the needs of the present.

Nine comrades, representatives of science, education, and culture, took part in the discussion. The deliberations of the taskforce were chaired by F. Lozowski.

The Work of the POP's With Youth (reported by Lucyna Lyszczak)

It is in the party's interest that party organizations at workplaces begin to treat youth and its organizations as partners from whom a new way of thinking and the solution of many basic problems can be learned. The experience and organizational skills of party activists, combined with a new interpretation of party-mindedness represented by the generation of the 20-year-olds, can become a desirable engine for further changes in world outlook.

Such was the guiding idea of the discussion of the POP's role in winning over youth to the party's idea. Many POP's fear the risk of failure in undertaking dialogue with educated youth thinking in somewhat different categories. It was stated that where the party organization is strong and the secretary is an authentic leader, good youth organizations are not lacking and informal youth groups do not become competitors. "Bribing" youth with, for example, attractive forms of recreation and entertainment is a blind alley and no place for ideology.

Leszek Roznanski, chairman of the SZSP [Socialist Union of Polish University Students] in Poznan, declared, "It is much more difficult to shape attitudes than to expand the organization on the basis of the unconvinced ones. The POP's often do not point youth toward clear ideas and concepts because they themselves experience moments of loss of direction. At plants and factories during the second stage of the economic reform there will be less and less room for civic activities and hence, the ZSMP [Union of Polish Socialist Youth] representative stated, this gap must be filled by new forms of work of socialist youth organizations in residential areas.

M. Minski declared, "At a time when old and seemingly fundamental concepts are undergoing incessant transformations, what is needed is not so much giving orders to youth as establishing a dialogue between party organizations and youth, including unaffiliated youth, on new principles. It is necessary to propagandize and initiate discussion. But initiative should originate with party members. For even informal talks can be a way of winning youth over to the ideas and program of the party. We no longer can afford the time to consider how to work with youth. We simply have to do it."

Nine speakers took part in the discussion. The deliberations of this taskforce were chaired by Member of the PZPR Voivodship Committee Secretariat Henryk Polrolniczak.

The Party in People's Councils and State Administration (reported by Lidia Zarow)

The topic stimulating the discussion at Taskforce Seven was a comment made by Member of the Voivodship People's Council from Sroda, Jerzy Sypien. His observations and experience suggest a number of conclusions to which party organizations cannot remain indifferent, especially in view of the coming elections to people's councils.

The marked decline in the proactivism of councilmen toward the end of their term of office has its reasons. They are chiefly the not always proper and responsible selection and recommendation of candidates for councilmen by party organizations. And once the elections are over, these reasons the low interest of the recommending party organizations in the activities of party-member councilmen. Party organizations do not adequately avail themselves of the possibilities of using party-member councilmen to convey social opinions, suggestions, and community assessments that would influence the decisions and resolutions adopted by people's councils. Similarly, there is little feedback of information about the activities of people's councils from party-member councilmen to their party organizations. These councilmen too do not always feel obliged to inform their POP's about their own activities. It is as yet a rare practice for party-member councilmen to cooperate with the party organizations within the offices of the

state administration, and conversely these organizations do not as yet feel a need to maintain contacts with the councilmen. Thus, the absence of such feedback not infrequently causes party-member councilmen to feel abandoned and impotent and to become less proactive.

And yet, people's councils and especially the caucuses of party-member councilmen as well as the party organizations active within the state administration face tremendous tasks to accomplish, tasks which require pronounced militancy in action. These tasks were discussed by the Poznan Voivode Bronislaw Stepowski: first of all, there are such socially important issues as the need to alter the operating procedures and organization of work at government offices in the direction of simplifying them and decentralizing powers and competences. This will require overcoming the old habits of "officialdom," a change in mentality, and the formation of a totally new model of conduct of the government employee.

In the discussion, which was chaired by Member of the Executive Board of the Poznan Voivodship PZPR Committee Roman Czamanski, nine comrades took the floor.

(Reported by Zygmunt Rola)

In the afternoon began the second part of the plenary session. Those present listened to reports presented by representatives of the various taskforces on their deliberations, whereupon Jozef Baryla took the floor. Speaking of the second stage of the economic reform, he declared that it affords a huge opportunity not only for enterprises but also for the party. Under the new conditions the POP cannot work in the old manner. We are about to witness a thoroughgoing reorganization of the central government, which will imply corresponding changes in the voivodships, cities, and gminas. Recalling that during the period preceding the Fourth Central Committee Plenum and following that event there occurred a marked revival of the work of basic party organizations, he drew attention to the still existing shortcomings and deficiencies. As yet, the implementation of the adopted resolutions is weak, the growth of party membership, chiefly in the countryside, is inadequate, and work with youth is poor, as is the implementation of personnel policy. J. Baryla also evaluated the Poznan Voivodship party organization, one of the 12 largest among the Polish voivodships with more than 50,000 members and candidate members each, and one of the leading ones, with good results of its party work. One of its weaknesses is the low proportion of young members, along with excessively great variations in the performance of the best and the worst party chapters and an inadequate utilization of its aktiv. J. Baryla conveyed moreover greetings from First Central Committee Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski, who wished the Poznan Voivodship party organization good results of work.

Next, a resolution defining the tasks of strengthening the basic party elements was adopted.

The last item on the agenda was personnel changes. In connection with the transfer of Edmund Borowiak, the departing director of the Agriculture Department under the Poznan Voivodship PZPR Committee, to the post of director of the Voivodship Bureau of Geodesy and Greenery, he was relieved of his previous duties. The Executive Board of the Voivodship PZPR Committee nominated Edmund Mandziak, the incumbent-first secretary of the Kostrzyn City-Gmina PZPR Committee, to the post left vacant by Edmund Borowiak. The members of the Voivodship Committee approved this nomination.

1386

Army PZPR Control-Auditing Meeting
26000063a Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
23 Oct 87 p 2

[Text] A meeting of the Polish Army PZPR Control-Audit Committee on 22 October was devoted to the inspirational role of the party organization in training and educating soldiers. The effects of rational management in the armed forces were also evaluated.

Participating in the meeting were Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak, Central Committee Politburo member and chairman of the PZPR Central Control-Audit Committee, and General of Division Tadeusz Szacilo, head of the Main Political Directorate of the Polish Army.

12776

ZSL Notes Gas Shortages in Agriculture, Editorial Change
26000055b Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
21 Oct 87 p 2

[PAP report: "Meeting of the Presidium of the National Committee of the ZSL"]

[Text] The Presidium of the ZSL National Committee at its meeting on 20 October 1987 heard information on the current socio-political and economic situation in Poland. Concern was strongly voiced about the delays in agriculture caused by the shortage of diesel fuels. This can negatively impact agricultural harvests next year. The difficulties with supplies of diesel fuels resulted not only from objective causes but from subjective ones, too. The Presidium called for a rapid decision to ensure a change in this situation and for a public explanation of the causes of the existing situation and announcement of measures to improve supplies.

Issues associated with the campaign leading up to the congress and the 16th plenum of the National Committee on the roles and tasks of the ZSL in accelerating the reform and strengthening the socialist state were also discussed.

In conjunction with the naming of Roman Wysocki to the office of advisor to the president of the ZSL National Committee, the presidium recalled him from the position of editor-in-chief of *DZIENNIK LUDOWY* and expressed its appreciation for his work in that position. It named Janusz Tarniewski, previously deputy editor-in-chief of *DZIENNIK LUDOWY*, editor-in-chief.

Piotr Stepień, president of the Tarnobrzeg ZSL Voivodship Committee participated in the meeting.

13021

'Multiple' Agricultural Solutions Proposed in Szczecin
26000063d Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
23 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Henryk Prawda: "Harvests Can be Bigger"]

[Text] Broad consultation on problems of rational and effective use of tillable land that preceded the PZPR Provincial Committee's plenary session on the subject, which took place 22 October in Szczecin, brought an abundant yield.

For many years, Western Pomeranian land has produced fairly good results in the form of high yields of grain, rape and root crops. For example, for two years grain yields have reached 38 quintals per hectare. But such yields, not recorded in a number of other regions, are not satisfactory; there are opportunities for improving them further, it was said during the session, led by Provincial Committee First Secretary Stanislaw Miskiewicz.

Kazimierz Wachowski, member of the Multi-Structured Cooperative for Agricultural Products: In our agriculture we must finally depart from organizational stereotypes and permit a variety of forms of management on the land. One of the models is our cooperative in Cieszysslowie. Here the farmer that join it—and there are already 136 from several villages—maintain their farms as their own, while those who join without land receive it on long-term lease from the cooperative's resources.

Tadeusz Walkowiak, Kolbacz ZSD: I suggest that we stop constantly wondering and complaining about acidic soil and shortages of fertilizer lime. Let us do something specific and new in this matter. For example, should the farmers of Szczecin not establish a partnership of their own that would finance projects to prospect for local lime deposits and mine them?

Henryk Sadzinski, specialist at the Dobra Nowogardzka state farm: We do not give up on even the smallest patch of the poorest soil as others do. We give such land back to the state farm employees on lease.

Zbigniew Michalek, deputy Politburo member and PZPR Central Committee secretary, referred to the many comments, proposals and motions in the discussion. He recall the basic truth that the land is a national resource. The one who uses it to better advantage is richer for it.

In these times we must stand on the best, said Z. Michalek. They are the ones who will decide about food production and not only about that. In agriculture too the second stage of reform will address increasing efficiency and initiative.

12776

Lodz PZPR Plenum Focus on Export Production
26000063c Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
23 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Jan Kraszewski: "Export—Compulsion or Opportunity"]

[Text] Of the 262 socialized enterprises in the province, only 157 sell their products abroad. Just 23 of them (9 percent) produce more than half of these exports. "Wolczanka," "Prochnik," "Skogar," "Ema-Elester," "Fonica," "Boruta" and Pabianice's "Polfa" place at the top. So there are many reserves in Lodz's industry. Even more in small-scale manufacturing and foreign firms.

This attitude was represented by the majority of participants in discussion at a plenary session of the PZPR's Lodz Provincial Committee, which took place 22 October. An earlier analysis of the condition of and possibilities for export, presented by committee secretary Adam Walczak, offered a field for the formation of specific conclusions.

It is encouraging, despite the many restraints noted, that in 1987 industry in Lodz will record a 42 percent increase in exports calculated in costs of production and 10 percent in foreign currency.

It was characteristic that the biggest exporters were most concerned about monitoring and increasing the growth of sales.

The foreign customer, it was stressed, is not interested in our problems. The contract has to be fulfilled at the appointed time. Of necessity, we are undertaking exports of processed goods. It is profitable but not to the extent of products from our own fabrics and accessories. But on the other hand, their quality is not the best.

12776

ROMANIA

Controversial Writer Buzura's Five Novels Examined

27000030a Bucharest STEAUA in Romanian
No 10, Oct 87 p 35

[Article by Gheorghe Glodeanu: "The Novel as 'Diagnosis'"]

[Text] The five novels published so far by August Buzura reveal a militant writer profoundly involved in the issues of his time and of a present treated with great responsibility. Viewed in this context, the artistic creation provides an answer to events and is generated by the creator's constant need to express the truth through the means of his art. The work of art (in this case, the novel) is implicitly the reflection of the writer's ideas about a social and spiritual universe that—in view of the moralizing function of art—he wants to see increasingly pure. According to this idea, to see and write realistically is to be a conscience and to adopt an attitude gained through a serious investigation of reality. The writer does not isolate himself in his ivory tower, but goes out into the street to feel the pulse of the times and to gather immediate information about the society and the human psyche, thus substituting for the abstract studies contained in the great libraries. Augustin Buzura's civic attitude stems from his faith in the force of literature and in its power to exert a positive impact on people's conscience. That is why, in his works, the author does not evade open confrontations, but endeavors to establish man's place in the society in which he lives. Skillfully combining social observation with psychological analysis, Augustin Buzura continues the "school" of some exceptional writers of the period between the two world wars such as Liviu Rebreanu, Hortensia Papadat-bengescu, or Camil Petrescu. But the absolute originality of this Cluj writer is to be found in the experience that had the most profound impact on him: medicine. His scientific education has helped this writer clearly determine both his assets and his psychological and biological limitations and to better understand man, the main subject of his investigations, from all viewpoints. His "passion for precision, for nuances, for the whole, and for explaining" are all due to his scientific background. Thus, in interpreting Buzura's work we must proceed from the correlation between science (medicine) and literature, whereby the former ensures an expanded sphere of observation and scope of knowledge (particularly in the human areas), after which the experience gathered is transformed into text. Consequently, literature constitutes a specific kind of knowledge, a more precise understanding of man and society, and at the same time a linguistic experience that contains in itself the writer's endeavors to master words to the point of making them capable of rendering ideas with the greatest possible relevance. Trying to find an answer to the question "Why do I write?" A. Buzura confesses in his novel Notepad: "To search for an tell the truth, which is no one's monopoly, to stubbornly and incessantly repeat

it until it is heard and understood, to bear witness to one's time and place through appropriate artistic means worthy of the performances of their era, and to be people's voice and thoughts is an honorable obligation that is difficult to fulfill, and that is very beautiful precisely because of that, and is sufficient to justify any sacrifice or renunciation. While no one can, in the last analysis, defy physical death, we do have the power and means to defy spiritual death."

Ever since the publication of his first novel, *The Absentees* (1970), Buzura asserted himself as one of the most important contemporary representatives of analytical prose. His introspection is reinforced by particular care for the epic structure of the book, reminiscent of the French "new novel." This special concern with composition was evident in his second novel, *The Faces of Silence* (1974), too. The first part of the book dealt with the life of a minor journalist, Dan Toma, who suffers various difficulties because of his uncomfortably non-conformist nature. His daily life is also disrupted by the arrival of his father-in-law, Gheorghe Radu, a former party activist, who solicits his help in the matter of an older dispute with the Magureanu family. The symmetry of the novel is perfect: in order to be understood, Radu presents his life in the first section of the book—the purpose of the confession being to secure the support of a son-in-law with whom he is not on the best of terms. Finding himself an involuntary mediator in a cause in which he feels he cannot be the absolute judge, Dan Toma begins to investigate the truth. He listens to the other "side" and hears how Carol Magureanu, the alleged enemy, sees the things. The two confessions are presented evenly, and the reader the freedom of choice in the difficult issue of attributing the blame. The presentation of the individual in his struggle to find and assert the true meaning of his life makes *The Faces of Silence* into a novel of the human condition.

The novel *Prides* (1977) essentially depicts the drama of a conscience in confrontation with itself through the years and particularly with the limitations and stupidity of those with whom it comes into contact. The action centers on Professor Ion Cristian, an excellent surgeon and scientist, whose life was marked by several unusual trials. From this viewpoint, the novel can be likened to a Renaissance painting: at the center of it is Dr. Ion Cristian, while the other characters are important only to the extent that they bring out the professor's individuality. The action takes place at the present time, but the present is the point of departure for constant recollections. What makes this novel remarkable is not its use of modern narrative, but its outstanding investigation of the human psyche. The development, careful construction, and skillful handling of peak moments attest to a cerebral writer, an architect who can alternate the various narrative planes in a way that precludes monotony. "Equal doses of rationality and drama," Camil Petrescu once said, and his axiom was justly adopted by many contemporary Romanian writers. And to ensure that the

analysis is as complex as possible, Augustin Buzura conceived his novel in several layers, each character being the bearer of a certain viewpoint, a "reflection" of Ion Cristian's past.

With his lively and inventive spirit, August Buzura is constantly concerned with the new, rejecting the facile anchoring in the areas on which he already has an undeniably firm grip. The inner need to continuously rejuvenate his writing is also evident in his following novel, *The Voices of the Night* (1980) which, in contrast to the previous ones, appears as a "history" of topical events. The epic scenario of the book takes the form of an investigation which, because of the absurd situation that it generates, brings to mind Kafka's *The Trial*, an affiliation that is admitted by the novel's narrator, Stefan Pintea. Although this novelistic convention (the investigation) has somewhat lost its impact because of frequent use, the book does not embrace the clichés of the "obsessive decade," but assumes a new time dimension, namely the present. The narrative follows several epic threads that proceed from different points toward a common center and end up by presenting the image of the whole. The proliferation of narrative planes necessarily breaks up the time planes into minimal, superimposed sequences. The pace of the novel is slow, and the emphasis is put on analysis, so that the action progresses rather laboriously. Stefan Pintea's confessions constitute a reevaluation of his own life, which can justify the culpability or innocence of the character.

As the fruit of direct contact with the immediate reality, A. Buzura's latest novel, *Refuges* (1984), is the overture to an epic cycle entitled *The Death Wall*. The novel is written from the viewpoint of a woman, Ioana Olaru, something that from the very beginning suggests a clearly heightened sensitivity, as well as the fact that the heroine is turned into a symbol of vulnerability. Compositionally speaking, the book is structured back to front: hospitalized in the "emotional section" of a psychiatric clinic, Ioana Olaru gradually reconstructs her past. The X-raying of her own consciousness in the reclusion of the clinic constitutes an act of self-knowledge and a possibility of circumventing one's own individuality. The title of the book is symbolic, too, in the sense that "continuously harrassed, reduced to the biological functions, people seek various refuges..."

In itself the flight of the main characters from the brutal effect of an aggressive environment, the almost painful clarity of the introspection, and the stress put on confession reveal A. Buzura as a novelist obsessed by the anatomy of the human psyche, and his characters as "intellectual Ahasveroses" meditating on their own condition.

YUGOSLAVIA

Serb Grass-Roots Leaders in Kosovo Sketched *28000019 Belgrade MLADOST in Serbo-Croatian* *2 Nov 87 pp 22-23*

[Article by Momcilo Petrovic: "While You Swim With the Mainstream"]

[Text] At the beginning of 1986, when the first mass gatherings of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo brought to the foreground the names of several "ordinary individuals," the official political forums did not permit themselves to be surprised: they forcefully condemned the "attempt to establish a partnership relationship." It turned out very quickly, however, that normal procedures did not apply in this case: the prestige of Kosta Bulatovic, Miroslav Solevic, Bosko Budimirovic, and Bogdan Kecman, among a people constantly exposed to the activity of Albanian separatists, grew in direct proportion to the number of detentions for "informative talks," arrests, and accusations that they were acting on the basis of nationalistic positions and at the orders of foreign intelligence services.

"They are born leaders," one weekly newspaper wrote.

In an exclusive interview for MLADOST, Bulatovic, Solevic, and Budimirovic, three members of the "four-member executive committee of Serbian nationalism" (the fourth is Kecman), as they were recently called in an article in RILINDJA by commentator Veton Suroj (whose mother is the sister of Vahida Kabasi, the wife of Fadilj Hodza, a fact which in view of conditions in Kosovo, it has turned out, ought to be noted) again reject any thought of leadership:

"My influence lasts only as long as I swim with the mainstream, faster than them, and tell them, 'Watch out for the waterfall!' The moment that I move away from the mainstream, they will throw me up onto the bank. But people will listen to a leader even when he tells them to swim against the current. Gruljic (Zoran Gruljic, an engineer whose emigration upset the inhabitants of Kosovo—author's note) was a 'leader.' But where is he now?" Miroslav Solevic says.

Leaders Against a Background of Monotony

They do not deny their influence over the masses, but apparently do not make an effort to define its roots. They consider their activity (or rather, activities, because in their case, they say, there is by coincidence a great similarity of views, but not deliberate combined activity) to be natural.

"I was an activist from my childhood days; I did what I thought was best for Yugoslavia, and I am doing the same thing now," says Bosko Budimirovic.

And it is not difficult to see the reasons why the Serbian and Montenegrin population of Kosovo trusts them: for the first time in the last few decades, someone who is not part of the "ruling structure" has turned to the people with his own view of a certain problem; this in itself was enough to make them stand out against the background of the monotony of our political life. Everything else afterwards was easier: their speaking talent and the language with which they address the public, a language different from that in official use, as well as the rally of several thousand residents of Kosovo Polje from the meeting of the Central Committee at which the "further directions of development" were adopted. A necessary consequence of the failure of their attempt to act through the Local Conference of the SSRN [Socialist Alliance of Working People] and the LC Action Conference in Kosovo Polje, of which they were active members in 1981, in a situation in which official policy had suffered a total collapse, is precisely what the forums are faced with today: the gaping hole that they left in their thoughtlessness (?) and conceit has been filled by others. And this is also the reason for the opposition to "leadership," since, if it is understandable for Bulatovic to have been arrested at the order of the Kosovo party leadership of that time, which, as we have seen, acted under the leadership of Fadilj Hodza on the basis of counterrevolutionary positions, then why did the "others" completely dispute the activities of the "leaders," if not because of a violation of the principles that regulate monopoly over the trust of the masses? Any other answer implies even more unfavorable conclusions, because the events of the second half of the third week of October (the assessment of the positions of Fadilj Hodza, the meeting of the Provincial Committee of the Kosovo LC, the expulsion of six Kosovo leaders from the party, and the sending of a federal SUP [Secretariat for Internal Affairs] detachment to Kosovo) also mean the fulfillment of 30 percent of the demands voiced at the mass protest meetings in the southern province, demands in whose formulation it was precisely the "leaders" who played a great role.

Unanimity on Replacement

It should be observed that since their first speeches, Bulatovic and the others have moderated their demands to a certain extent, and that they are no longer letting their rhetorical enthusiasm and the masses carry them to heights from which immoderate statements are very easily made. If one adds to this the fact that with the passage of time the forums have also become more aware of the essence of the Kosovo problems, their "platform" today is no more than an outline, which can be criticized without pulling out a nightstick—an outline of whose radicalism they are aware themselves, but which they justify by the need for a bitter remedy for a bitter wound.

They are unanimous in stating that the first step has to be replacing and condemning all of the leaders who are responsible for the continued activity of Albanian nationalists and separatists. This, which they call the

"first precondition for stabilizing the situation," will be difficult to accomplish, however. Not taking into account the current political situation and not caring about "the need to turn our backs on the past," they are also emphasizing their emotional need for "everyone" to be held accountable. According to them, the list is not difficult to compile: it contains the names of those who have decided the fate of the country from the liberation until today. This, of course, is also the first point of conflict with official policy: it is impossible to separate the "problematical" idea that "the weaker Serbia is, the stronger Yugoslavia is" and its "continued implementation" from the name of Josip Broz Tito. "We do not have any facts on how much he knew about the events here while he was alive, but he must have known everything." As far as postwar Serbian leaders are concerned, their condemnations are much harsher: they say that the rise of Fadilj Hodza and the almost unhindered activity of Albanian separatists would not have been possible without their (merely?) tacit blessing. It was only with Slobodan Milosevic and the "exposure of the Stambolic-Pavlovic group" that Serbia "got a real leader, but he has to be helped by others, from the Serbian and other leaderships, in order to be able to realize his ideas." This is the first point in common with official policy: insistence on the fact that Kosovo is a Yugoslav problem ("The goal of the Albanian separatists is to create a situation of chaos in Yugoslavia in order to realize their dream of a Greater Albania, just as they did during World War II"—Solevic) and insistence on equalizing the position of Serbia with that of the other republics in the federation, something which differs only in nuances from the demands of the Serbian republic expressed during the current discussions of changes to the Constitution. The demand for "dissolving the Kosovo LC" (Solevic), just as unrealistic as it is unnecessary, is obviously more a product of overheated passions than of sober consideration.

Extraordinary Measures Desirable

Viewing emigrants from Albania and their offspring as the nucleus of separatist activity, Budimirovic, Solevic, and Bulatovic feel that in order to curb nationalism, it is necessary to disperse these people throughout all of Yugoslavia. "Why do they have to be here (in Kosovo—author's comment), when the Serbs cannot... If the rest do not want to receive them, if the resettlement is anticonstitutional, then the Constitution should be changed," says Bosko Budimirovic.

Just as this demand is contrary to [Yugoslavia's] basic commitments, it is also infeasible: even if someone were willing to risk the tumultuous social and ethnic upheavals that would inevitably result from this step, it would be difficult to find an area willing to receive the newcomers, not for national reasons, but rather for economic ones; and thus statements like "Slovenia has offered us fraternal assistance; let it be shown in action" (Bulatovic), and "Let whoever gave them the money to buy houses in Kosovo give it to them now" (Solevic) remain

on the level of political fantasy, but the consequences of a failure to meet this fantastic demand, at least judging by the mood of the Serbian and Montenegrin population in Kosovo, are very possible and very real. So who knows what to do...

Contrary to the intention ascribed to them by institutionalized political forces, of attempting through their speeches to provoke an armed conflict and the intervention of Yugoslav or foreign armed forces, the "leaders," expressing the opinion of their fellow citizens as well, decisively state that their activities are aimed at preventing such possibilities. "The army is here to protect us from foreign enemies," says Budimirovic. They unanimously feel that the separatist movement can be curbed through political action, but they believe that certain extraordinary measures, such as sending political cadres and police units from other areas, would yield good results (this interview was conducted three days before the SFRY Presidency decided to send the federal militia into Kosovo, and that step was hoped for but assessed as unlikely).

That is because "the main thing is to destroy the nucleus of the separatist movement, by dismantling the biological bomb," says Solevic, explaining as follows:

"Kosovo gets \$420 million from the Fund for the Underdeveloped, which is equivalent to 18 million old dinars per inhabitant... Of the 4 dinars for parental benefits, Yugoslavia contributes 3, and the province's associated labor contributed 1 dinar. The state is thus financing the high birth rate: I claim that in the "Ramiz Sadiku" GIK, 80 percent of the employees get more in parental benefits than in wages... All federal contributions should be halted, at least for six months, and then the Shiptars [Albanians] themselves, 99 percent of whom live and work honestly, will attack Fadilj themselves, and they will see where he has brought them... We here in Kosovo could make a living from our work if all the money given to us in the past for aid had not been used for unproductive investments and for the avarice of the separatists... Their privileges were paid for by Yugoslav funds."

Leaders Are Evident

The demands for a reexamination of the way in which funds are allocated for Kosovo from the Federal Fund reached the agenda of our political forums much later than they were sent from Kosovo by the Serbs and Montenegrins. The point of conflict is today the third point in common between the official documents and the informal outline for resolving the Kosovo crisis. By mutual desire?

The fact is that the "members of the executive committee" have at least formally disassociated themselves from the Association of Serbian Writers and the members of

the "bourgeois right." Bulatovic did so because he does not agree with "certain steps" by his namesake, while Solevic cites the reasons, both formal and principled, as follows:

"I told Bulatovic not to phone me anymore, because they were tapping my phone both at home and at work, and probably his as well... I do not know Cosic personally, but they are using him and the "bourgeois right," and their alleged links with us, to frighten all those Yugoslavs who support us. It is as though we in Kosovo were cattle, and could not think for ourselves, so someone had to dictate to us. Kosta Bulatovic's refraining from speaking at meetings, "on orders," admittedly, from the party and state authorities, is not the result of fear, as certain new "pretenders" to his prestige and reputation are trying to show, but rather, it seems, the result of a desire to moderate the confrontation."

Although they are not optimistic ("We are closer to a civil war than a peaceful solution," says Solevic; "I am looking for work everywhere in Yugoslavia... In two months, I think, I will emigrate," says Bulatovic—both in statements recorded before the meeting of the Provincial Committee of the Kosovo LC and everything that followed it), the "leaders of the Serbs and Montenegrins" are obviously a factor in the situation in Kosovo, in both positive and negative senses.

Obviously, the forums are also taking them into account.

If not, Miroslav Solevic would not have been invited on Thursday, 22 October, for a talk at the Republic Conference of the Serbian SSRN [Socialist Alliance of Working People].

9909

Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency Member on Agrokomerc Scandal

28000030 Zagreb *DANAS* in Serbo-Croatian
10 Nov 87 pp 16-18

[Interview with Petar Dodik, member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Mladen Maloca: "The Work of Powerful Groups"]

[Text] [Question] The Agrokomerc case attracted the attention of the public not only to the region of Velika Kladusa, but also to Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, especially since Agrokomerc and its already famous director Fikret Abdic were followed by an entire series of scandals that shook that republic. It is sufficient to recall the all-powerful Jola Musa, followed by the electric power station on the Neretva, Travnik, Zenica, and several other smaller ones. What is going on, what is this about, and is there any common denominator among all of these scandals and criminal actions?

[Answer] It seems to me that we can speak of two causes. One, of course, is the long-standing practice in which enterprises' management and administrative structures coalesce with certain political centers, and form a sort of parallel line, i.e., form certain powerful groups, consisting particularly of people from large organizations and certain people in the political leaderships who have acted as their protectors or their assistants. In the Agrokomerc case, obviously, Fikret Abdic was a great friend of Hakija Pozderac, who was probably also the originator of all those ideas and solutions. Also obvious was their link with Hamdija and several other people here in the political leadership of the republic. That group was so powerful that it could simply eliminate all of those supervisory institutions—from the SDK [Social Accounting Service] on down—and on the other hand, exert influence over the banks, not only here, but also in other places. They maintained their contacts and business connections through bribery, but also through the political influence of people who are known to the entire country.

On the other hand, recently in Bosnia-Herzegovina there has been heightened accountability for illegal actions, profitable embezzlements, crime, etc., and so in a relatively short period, a multitude of cases that had been smoldering for many years came to light. People knew it, for example, in Mostar. It was not brought up for a long time, however, and so it now appears that some strange things are happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Question] Are processes of differentiation then under way in Bosnia-Herzegovina, among its leaderships, with the desire of eliminating the negative practice that you have mentioned? How much have such clean-up efforts been influenced by the crisis trends on the national level?

[Answer] I would say that it is a parallel process. Obviously, the entire country has become aware because of the crisis situation that such things have to be cleaned up. That demand is very strong, and the resistance of the power centers has considerably weakened, due to the general conditions and especially to the democratization process, to which the news media have particularly contributed.

[Question] For a long time people pictured Bosnia-Herzegovina as an area where there was no unrest, and its unity, at least from outside, seemed monolithic. Has Agrokomerc changed this picture much?

[Answer] I would say that we have done away with monolithism a long time ago, both in society and in the LC. As far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, perhaps the remnants of monolithism are somewhat more pronounced than in some other Yugoslav republics, because of certain special and unique circumstances, primarily its ethnic complexity. This creates the impression that the time of peace has passed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in view of all these incidents I would say that it is also a consequence of this wave of democratization that I

mentioned. It has swept the entire country, and could not have bypassed our republic either. I think that it is the general framework and general cause that has led to the shift in which the public today has a somewhat different picture of Bosnia-Herzegovina than it did previously. In fact, it is also likely that the influence of certain groups, which constantly insisted on unity at any price, sometimes on an unsound basis, has weakened. I am not saying that it has completely weakened, but in this weakening of its influence I see one of the causes of the processes that will open up room for all the creative forces that were somnolent for a long time and could not express themselves. I hope that this will be a new element in a more stable future, an element in the greater creativity and greater efficiency of the system in practice.

[Question] Several times in our conversation you have indicated the existence of groups. Could you say more precisely exactly which groups you are talking about?

[Answer] Well, I said at the very beginning that this was a question of links between management structures and certain people in political forums, and their spreading outside the system. Since they have such prestige, such influence on a broad level, it is logical that their power has grown to the extent demonstrated in the Agrokomerc case. These groups are hard to identify with individuals, but in any case it is obvious that this has to do with a long-standing practice of rule by groups; relapses and remnants of this will continue to appear. I hope that in time we will be able to overcome this. I say in time, because I think that it is a delusion to believe that all of this can be eliminated overnight.

[Question] It is well known that Bosnia-Herzegovina built its development strategy on the basis of large systems that united entire branches of the economy. How much has this model, by concentrating economic power and then political power as well among a small number of individuals, contributed to beginning the formation of the groups we are discussing?

[Answer] I would say that this is both an interesting and a relevant question. We actually did build large organizations by economic branches. As a rule, those who came as the managers of these large organizations were cadres from politics, from political leaderships, and in some cases even the presidents of executive councils. Logically, they had ties with people at both higher and lower levels. With their past influence, of course, they also created room for the organization to have greater influence over various institutions in the system, and especially the banks. Naturally there was an alliance between these people and people in politics. In this regard, however, it is also necessary to state the following. The view that was prevalent among us, and is still prevalent today, is that the creation of these large organizations accelerated the development of the entire republic, and contributed to building it up as a more independent sociopolitical community. Time will probably show how great the influence of these organizations was and

whether they were fully justified. The assessments so far are still favorable, although large systems, as is well known, are sluggish, and perhaps some organizations would have developed faster outside of them, just as some others would have developed more slowly. In any case, it is understandable that when someone speaks in the name of 50 or 80 thousand people, he also has a certain political influence upon political structures as well. Thus, in addition to all the positive elements we mentioned in regard to large systems, that alliance was created, which also showed its other darker side, leading to negative consequences for both social relationships and economic development.

[Question] To what extent was Fikret Abdic the result of such a concept?

[Answer] His appearance and the appearance of Agrokomerc were in fact a consequence of such processes and alliances. He also has some unique characteristics, however. As we know, Agrokomerc emerged in the least developed part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The highest illiteracy rate was there after the war, and the social, health, and economic standard of living was extremely low. It is in that social environment that one should to some extent seek the reasons for what happened. And as far as Fikret's power and the power of the people around him is concerned, its emergence was possible as a result of support from people in political leaderships, but also of the fact that he could cite 12,000 workers, facilities constructed, and firms throughout the entire region. For those people, this really was great and inconceivable progress. Fikret's power grew from the support of the people, who skipped centuries overnight, so to speak. Fikret was perceived as a savior, as a demigod, as a protector. And when you take into account his ties with people in political forums and the strong support of the people who perceived their own prosperity, then perhaps you can understand more easily how and why all of this happened. Unfortunately, no one knew about the other side, because the real sources of financing were concealed for a long time. Now it is clear to everyone that everything was on an unsound economic basis, and the real picture has been revealed.

[Question] Will political action be able to dispel the myth that Abdic created around himself?

[Answer] I believe that through political action we will be able to get people to come to their senses. The fact is that Fikret Abdic and some others, especially Hamdija, put many people who did not support them and who recognized the unsound foundations on a sort of blacklist if they spoke badly of them. They perceived any warning as an attack against them personally. For example, I was on good terms with Fikret Abdic, and in a way I also had sympathy for Agrokomerc. Nevertheless, when the well-known telex discoveries appeared, I interpreted this as a significant indicator that their economic situation was not sound. I assumed that this had to do with losses, and I requested verification in order to determine more

precisely their real economic situation. Both Fikret and the other people, however, took this quite personally, but our intention and purpose was to find a solution for what turned out to be their serious economic situation by determining the real state of affairs. I can say with confidence that if we had accomplished this in the spring, I believe that what is happening there today would not have happened. We should not have allowed things to get to that point; we should have put more effort and resources into saving what could be saved and was economically justified.

[Question] What kept your initiative and the initiative of other people from being accepted, and prevented the course you proposed from being taken earlier?

[Answer] The obstacles again were Fikret Abdic and the board of directors; opposition also came from their supporters. They had their own strategy, which was unsound and which would only have postponed for a while the difficulties facing them. This has to do—and I am saying this for the first time—with their request for a \$200 million loan. They estimated that with these funds, they could get through the difficulties they were encountering. I think that this was their strategy, but it was a shaky one, since who would give the organization, about which something was already known, so much money? Their strategy was just as realistic as Hitler's hope that he would end the war in his favor by developing the atom bomb.

[Question] You mentioned the situation regarding the lack of information. From everything that has been heard and discovered, it is evident that it was known fairly early what was happening in Agrokomerc, although an attempt was made to give the public a different impression.

[Answer] The illegal acts at Agrokomerc have been going on for a long time now, and they do not date just from this year. The area of Cazin and Velika Kladusa was fairly closed off, due to the power of individuals, and so one could be free to say that all of the system's institutions there were shut out, you might say. They were neutralized, and even the Internal Affairs Secretariat in Kladusa was powerless. Previously we did not receive even a single report from Agrokomerc and Velika Kladusa, and it was only due to the fire that broke out there that people from the Republic SUP [Internal Affairs Secretariat] found evidence of illegalities.

Naturally, people ask why. Well, it is precisely because they were able to eliminate all of the supervision bodies, which were unable to go there.

[Question] In spite of those explanations, people are continuing to ask why, if the Presidency of the republic and other executive and assembly bodies knew as early as April and had reports about criminal and illegal acts at Agrokomerc, they did not exercise their prerogatives and thus prevent even greater damage?

[Answer] The first report that we received from the SUP was supported by all of the members of the Presidency, except for Hamdija, who was reserved. I would say that awareness and recognition of the extent of crime at Agrokomerc among people in the leadership grew gradually. One could not say that the leadership did not react, because we asked the SDK to determine the number of uncovered promissory notes. That SDK report was ready on 22 May, and it showed that there was an enormous number of such promissory notes. One could also not say that the increase in promissory notes prompted the SDK and other services to put a stop to it. But they were obligated to put a stop to it, although it was not so easy to do, because Abdic and his proteges and protectors had tremendous influence and power in the bank there, and they had 16 delegates of their own in the assembly, instead of the two they were entitled to. In that way they could outvote the entire Assembly. Due to such influence, they had the endorsement of promissory notes transferred from the local bank to Agrokomerc. Agrokomerc thus become a bank branch, which is simply unbelievable and contrary to regulations. And they did not rest content with blocking our intervention; they relocated the printing of promissory notes out of Kladusa. They forged seals, and distributed the printing of promissory notes among OOURs [basic organizations of associated labor], to some villages, and to some shops, so that the last place where we found the forged seals and where promissory notes was printed was in some shop in Cazin. We only discovered that site in August! They operated like mafiosi, and it was therefore not easy to put a stop to all of that.

[Question] I also asked you this question because of the fairly widespread opinion that this action was not undertaken more resolutely because of disunity within the leadership.

[Answer] With respect to unity, differences did exist. No matter how unanimous we were in adopting our decisions, the actions in implementing them were not energetic enough. There was also some resistance to arriving at the right decisions, and for that reason a great deal of time was needed. And when these decisions were adopted, they were carried out slowly. The people at Agrokomerc counted on support from the Pozderac brothers and others, especially at the banks, for example Pelivan, and some people in the executive council—I won't say the entire council—had sympathy for their plans. They expected that in that way their influence and their lobby would prevail, and that they would finally accomplish what they had planned. Our mistake is that we did not go into action more energetically and decisively. But there is an objective reason and explanation for this. Specifically, for a long time we did not know the real state of affairs, and we believed that Agrokomerc was a sound organization, and when it turned out that it was not, the real scale of their machinations was unknown. And so it was only a few days ago that it was learned and established that this was a question of fraud and losses amounting to 180 billion [dinars].

[Question] Speaking before the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina about the chronology of the Presidency's action and yours personally, you also mentioned Branko Mikulic; you said, approximately, that in a conversation on 30 April he tried to dissuade you, saying that the appropriate services were already doing their jobs. What was this about?

[Answer] I mentioned that conversation with Branko Mikulic because, in front of the delegates, I had to defend my own moral integrity and that of my comrades who thought the same way and acted the same way in the Presidency. This is because, as you have probably heard, the delegates were saying that we had not had enough courage, that they had had a high opinion of us, and that we had turned out to be like little boys whom Hamdija had led around more or less as he wanted. That is a mistaken picture, and I wanted to show them that this was not the case. I consequently read excerpts from my statements at that first meeting as well, in order to make them see what had happened there and so that they could see that it was not a meeting of immature individuals who accepted everything that Hamdija told them. Seeing how things were developing, I really decided firmly then that I was going to submit my resignation and save face, especially at the end of my career. One day, sometime after 1 May, Branko Mikulic visited me and talked to me about that. He urged me not to take such a step, because it was legally the responsibility of the Yugoslav SDK to verify and determine everything relating to Agrokomerc. He told me that he had also spoken with the director general of the Yugoslav SDK and that he was certain that the Yugoslav SDK would clear everything up and that everything would come to light. He also said that the appropriate services, both the SDK and the SUP and the prosecutor's office, would do their jobs. After I received such assurances that everything would not be covered up and hidden from the public and the public authorities, I felt that it would be inadvisable to resign, and I decided not to.

[Question] In regard to responsibility for Agrokomerc, various opinions have been heard, but the main impression is that there is a disparity between what happened there and the responsibility of individuals. The recent events refute such a view, to a certain extent, but a new question arises: where does this chain end, and how far will it reach?

[Answer] The last few months have been a process of gaining insight into the dimensions of the scandal and necessarily clarifying its causes and consequences. The news media have made an invaluable contribution to this, and no one has performed that role like them, not even the leaderships. We all needed time to realize that Fikret's power could not have arisen without an alliance with the Pozderac brothers, and without an alliance with other people, even in our Presidency. Thus we came first of all to Hakija, who was the originator of everything that happened there. And then we reached Hamdija. There

have been several controversies in this regard, for example, over Hamdija's explanation on the occasion of his resignation. I think that it should be stated that Hamdija's resignation was demanded; he did not exactly submit it voluntarily. That process was continued, and the end of yesterday's session of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina confirmed that we would go further in investigating responsibility. It is rather difficult to answer the question of where the chain of responsibility will end, but it seems to me that the process of determining the responsibility of the Presidency before the Assembly has concluded, and as for the Assembly and the Executive Council, the decision is that the responsibility of people in those bodies, if it exists, will be determined. I think that the process of differentiation in those places will thus be completed, and I hope that it will be completed with respect to the republic authorities in general.

[Question] The role of the police in clearing up the Agrokomerc case has been mentioned a great deal. Full credit is being given to the SUP authorities, but dilemmas have appeared; hasn't the emphasis on the SUP's role reduced the role of other state authorities?

[Answer] Yes, that is a pertinent question. I think that it is true that the public has been given a distorted picture of the role of the SUP. They really did do their jobs conscientiously and made a great contribution in clearing up the Agrokomerc scandal. But it is also worth noting that without the political support that the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina gave them from the start, they could not have performed their role. If the Presidency had not been unanimous in rejecting the idea of a state-party commission, it would have been hard for the SUP to carry out all of the responsible tasks that were before it. They acted at our request and with our support in clearing up the scandal. I am saying all of this to avoid giving the Yugoslav public the mistaken impression that some sort of police system prevailed in Bosnia-Herzegovina; that is not the case, since, as I said, the position of our Presidency and the Central Committee was that the authorities had to be permitted to do everything possible to uncover the scandal.

[Question] What are your views on how the processes will continue to develop in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Will they be a continuation of this already open democratization, or will it be halted?

[Answer] We are interested in achieving not only a verbal but also a real turnabout in practice, in the direction of democratization. One should not, however, believe that this will be easy and quick; there will still be resistance because of old habits and inertia, and there are still people who are not willing to go or to accept changes. We would really like to achieve such steps forward and progress, so that we can, as someone recently said, calculate time before Agrokomerc and after Agrokomerc.

Author Discusses Forces Behind Terrorism
28000029 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
21-22 Nov 87 p 5

[Interview with Dr Milan Pasanski, terrorism expert, by Slavko Curuvija: "Governments Are Aiding Terrorism"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] International terrorism is not a topic on which at least 20 million people can speak competently in Yugoslavia, as is the case of soccer and politics. But the average Yugoslav is nevertheless made aware every day of the fact that in the world at large a true and moreover very dirty war has been taking place for years, a war in which usually neither the belligerents nor the reasons for the war are known for sure. The present escalation of terrorist violence in Europe and beyond was the reason for us to interview Dr Milan Pasanski, docent and scientist from Belgrade on this topic; recently he wrote and published a book on this topic entitled "Savremene kamikaze" [Present-Day Kamikazes] and is one of the rare Yugoslav experts in international terrorism.

[Answer] According to my research, in just the last 40 days the world (9 countries on 4 continents) have seen more than 20 terrorist acts that were serious in their consequences and incidents involving firearms which were on the verge (the ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka). The casualties were 1,505 dead and 888 people injured.

[Question] Do you share the impression that there was a certain lull until this escalation?

[Answer] No, I don't. That is an appearance, since in Europe there were comparatively few spectacular terrorist acts in front of our eyes. But, judging by the data, overall terrorist activity has not been on the defensive. In West Germany alone, according to the official report of their internal affairs ministry, there were 318 terrorist acts committed in the first 9 months of last year.

The Sponsorship of the Intelligence Services

To be sure, we might speak about a certain abatement of terrorism over the entire continent of Europe after 1980, especially after 17 December 1981, when the American General Dozier was freed. Up until that time in Italy alone there were 13,000 assassinations attempted between 1971 and 1981, with more than 400 victims. It is thought that at the beginning of this decade there was a general showdown with terrorism on the part of certain governments. This had international implications for overall terrorist activity in the world.

[Question] Why do you say "it is thought"?

[Answer] Because the successes in combating terrorism, as you can see for yourself, have been only partial. Terrorism has been broken up in a number of states. The remnants of terrorist groups have fled and scattered

abroad. However, just when they were driven into a corner there was a qualitative change in the development of terrorism. Those scattered groups came under the "sponsorship" of the various intelligence services, which began to use them for their own aims on the basis of a convergence of interests. They supplied them with passports, money, and weapons.... They organized their training.

Then on the one hand there was an abrupt escalation of international terrorism, while on the other there was a mutual linking up of terrorist groups from various countries (RAF-"Direct Action," FARL "Direct Action," and so on), which collaborated more and more frequently on the international scene. For example, when the French authorities arrested G.I. Abdallah, leader of the Lebanese fraction of the Revolutionary Army (FARL), this organization's links with the Red Brigades and "Direct Action," which placed its terrorist "infrastructure" at the former's disposal, was unambiguously confirmed in a series of assassination attempts in Paris (when in September 1986 alone there were 9 deaths and 165 people injured). More recently, services of this kind have been performed by the terrorist underground as well, and in return the terrorists use their channels to funnel drugs or weapons to them or they provide other conveniences in "their own" countries.

[Question] Is this sufficient reason for this new phase of what you call governmentalized terrorism?

[Answer] That is one of the reasons. All the data indicate that since 1983 there has been a strong involvement of governments in the domain of a terrorism that until that time was more or less autochthonous. Following that period the myth was buried once and for all that the European terrorist organizations, especially the "old" ones, are authentic, autonomous, and self-sufficient in their political ideology and military organization.

Governments are aiding terrorism through very complicated and diversified and above all covert ways. Put simply, this is done in two ways: on the one hand terrorist acts are committed with an armed force in public, sometimes even with an excuse, while on the other support and encouragement is given to that terrorism which offers some benefit. Some countries carry on this latter in three ways: either they help existing terrorist groups and guide them to some extent, or they themselves set them up and direct them completely, or, in the third variant, they directly guide members of their own intelligence services in carrying out terrorist acts.

An example of the third kind is the action of the Israeli intelligence service against members of Black September, the terrorist organization which, as is well-known, massacred the Israeli team during the Munich Olympics in 1972. All over Europe the Israeli intelligence people

killed 31 people, 16 of them innocent ("mistaken identities"). In the last action in Norway the wrong man was killed. The Norwegian police arrested the assassins, and it all became known.

[Question] Why do present-day governments need all this?

[Answer] The explanation is relatively simple. From World War II up to the end of 1983—in the period of "peace"—there have been 146 armed conflicts in the world in which 16.5 million people have died. In that number, 9 million were civilians. Today, because of nuclear parity between the great powers and other well-known reasons in the overall picture, war is ceasing to be a convenient means of "extending policy by other means." However, to that same extent subversive activity, in which terrorism occupies a distinguished place, has been gaining in importance.

An Apparent Lull

[Question] And the consequences of the governmentalization of terrorism?

[Answer] Well, you see for yourself. It is impossible to suppress it. It is cyclically and spirally renewed unceasingly, always at a higher level. Back a bit you mentioned a lull. That so-called lull was only a phase in that cycle. For a time there is no terrorism, then as a rule it emerges as a surprise for those planning defensive measures, and it is on a considerably higher level: technically more refined, more professionalized, in new forms (new *modus operandi*), and with new generations of terrorists.

[Question] Does it not seem to you that certain governments are attempting to defend themselves against terrorism, and thus are to some extent courting "their own" terrorists?

[Answer] Some countries have achieved certain success in combating terrorism in their own country above all through their lenient attitude toward members of terrorist groups whose hands are not too "blood-stained." We are aware, say, of the Italian treatment of the so-called "repentants," and quite recently the moderations shown in the punitive policy of West Germany.

From this latter country, after a number of official reports on suicides in the prisons, we are beginning to receive reports of a considerably more liberal treatment of former terrorists in prisons and of their being released before the end of their sentences. The leftwing parties and representatives of the Greens are mainly advocating this kind of treatment of former terrorists. In the very recent past we have been witnesses of the vitriolic debate of this issue in West Germany.

The reason is that exactly when the government showed good faith in the conflict with demonstrators, that is, not with terrorists, four policemen died. A political conflict immediately began over the effectiveness and timeliness of the new measures.

In any case, as far as West Germany is concerned, the backbone of the present generation of terrorists in that country is made up of a "hard core" of about 30 people who have at hand about 200 militant activists, the same number of sympathizers, and about 2,000 accomplices.

[Question] Are the same methods really being used by every country?

[Answer] Whereas Italy and West Germany are adopting the "institution" of repentance, certain other countries, the United States of America, for example, are adopting laws which broaden the right of American security forces to operate even outside the borders of the United States for terrorist acts committed outside the United States. Recently, U.S. agents arrested a terrorist in Mediterranean waters who in 1985 hijacked an American airplane. These methods, which are obviously different, have arisen out of their own experiences. That is, unable to eradicate by force what are called the constants of terrorism, which regenerate it, certain governments are trying to eliminate its social causes. On the other hand they are attempting to "differentiate" the terrorists, and they are striking against those "hard core" terrorists without mercy.

[Question] In view of what you have said, what danger of terrorism threatens Yugoslavia?

[Answer] Traditionally, for more than 40 years, this danger has threatened us from the extreme anti-Yugoslav emigre community. To be sure, there has been less and less of this recently if we use as the criterion the terrorist acts committed. Most of the terrorist attacks on Yugoslavia were carried out by Ustasha organizations: the Movement To Create the State of Croatia (Hrvatski Drzavnotvorni Pokret), the Croatian People's Council, the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, and so on.

The Albanian Irredenta Is in the Forefront

However, since 1981 there has been increasing evidence of the Albanian emigre community. The most ambitious here at the moment are the "Movement for an Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia" (PARJ). It is headed by the leaders of the irredenta in Kosovo who fled. These are the ones who were the leaders of the underground organizations and groups in Kosovo ("Movement for National Liberation of Kosovo," "Group of Marxist-Leninists of Kosovo," "Red People's Front," etc.), and they had to flee abroad because of the measures of our authorities.

Incidentally, the largest number of them are in Belgium. They are organized just like the separatists within the country: they have their committees, programs, and bylaws.... They train to carry out terrorist attacks and they try to spread their influence among our workers abroad and to recruit them to carry weapons and explosives into the country and to carry out terrorist actions.

We should be aware that they are being ardently aided in all this by Albania. These are those government measures to encourage terrorism we talked about at the top. This neighboring country of ours is sparing no labor or money to turn the PARJ into the leading organizations of the Albanian emigre community. It has succeeded in this since the PARJ has completely suppressed the Balist-Zoguist emigre community, which originally had more influence.

[Question] Who threatens us from inside?

[Answer] We do not have autochthonous terrorist groups and organizations within the country. Those whom our security forces and participants in social self-protection have been fighting successfully in various ways are always—more or less visibly—tied up with the emigre community. I am referring both to groups of Albanian separatists and to certain terrorist groups in Croatia, and indeed also to groups that crop up from time to time in Serbia. The last case was when a group was discovered recently in Arandjelovac that called itself the Black Hand.

Transit Terrorism

[Question] And so-called "transit terrorism"?

[Answer] About 15,000 university and secondary students, most of them from Asian and African countries, are studying at the moment in our country. Certain foreign political organizations fighting for their political goals, in which they also use terrorist means, have a considerable influence on a minor portion of that population. Such organizations are the Ihvanul Muslimun, Hibz Tahrir, Al Dava, and so on. They carry out terrorist acts directly, but they can also be the "infrastructure" for "transit" terrorists passing through our country in their campaign against the West, and they may possibly come into contact with members of their organizations. After that they continue on to the West. In keeping with the "technology" of carrying out these actions—they get the weapons on the spot, and members of the organization in those countries lead them to the place of the action and provide them getaway. Our authorities are, of course, combating this. However, the problem is that most of these "transit" terrorists have not previously exposed themselves, and there are no data whatsoever on their terrorist past or terrorist ambitions. It is only when they pull the trigger that they go down in the records on international terrorists. When their movement is later reconstructed in certain foreign circles, Yugoslavia is accused of supporting international terrorism.

[Question] Is there a danger of a domestic terrorism being engendered within Yugoslavia?

[Answer] In our society certain preconditions are being cumulatively created that have given rise to terrorism in other countries in conjunction with a number of other elements. However, this does not mean that terrorism always and automatically does arise. There are several factors pro and con in a country, the occurrence of terrorism is favored by a conjunction of external (international) and internal factors in a society, while on the other hand it is favored by the subjective assessment of terrorists that a particular state of society can be altered only by terror.

The economic and political crisis of our society is being carried over to the moral plane with particularly negative overtones. The outbreak of the various scandals indicates major cases of embezzlement, bribery, and flagrant violation of the law. At the same time, the situation in Kosovo is potentially dangerous.

We dare not close our eyes, then, before the fact that although our society is democratic, the general deterioration of the situation in the country has been cumulatively creating the preconditions for political dissatisfaction to grow into something qualitatively different. In combination with the international preconditions which the planners of so-called special warfare against the SFRY are trying to bring about, all of this—in a particular convergence of circumstances—could give rise to certain forms of autochthonous domestic terrorism.

[Box, top]

The Black Balance Sheets

In West Germany "revolutionary cells" set fire to 15 large trucks carrying South African goods. In Mozambique on 31 October the National Resistance Movement set fire to 80 automobiles and killed 211 persons, and on 16 October they killed 53 motorists and set fire to a column of vehicles. In Sri Lanka 256 Indians died and 776 were injured and 800 Tamils were killed in 24 days of fighting between the Indian Peace Contingent and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ilam (LTTE). In Sri Lanka the "Tigers" killed more than 150 Singhalese, and there were 17 suicides in their own ranks, since the "Tigers" carry about their necks a necklace containing poison which they use at the right moment under command. Samora Mashel was killed in a familiar way. Terrorists from Pretoria activated a car bomb in a shopping center in Zimbabwe, which resulted in injuries to 17 persons. In Kabul, Afghanistan, explosion of a truck bomb in front of a mosque killed 27 persons and injured 35. In Lebanon at least 60 people have died from explosions of car bombs since the beginning of the year.

The group of Abu Nidal hijacked an Israeli yacht in the waters of Gaza, and eight persons were kidnapped. A bomb that was placed in a small town in Northern Ireland killed 11 and injured 50.

[Box, bottom]

Possible Scenario

The recent arrest of Gabriel Kerry, IRA leader, with a load of weapons is a very interesting case. The word from certain circles is that the weapons for the IRA were acquired in Libya. To be sure, the possibility exists that

Libya is behind that, but it is possible that some intelligence service that wants to compromise Libya as a country sponsoring terrorism is behind it. In such cases the scenario is as follows: at the moment when the goods are taken over, notice is given, say, to the French that the vessel is passing along their shores. The French react, and all the agencies publish news about the arrest. There is a double result: Great Britain gets rid of the leader of the IRA, Libya is once again compromised as a country which supposedly is encouraging terrorism.

07045

ROMANIA

Activity of Military History, Theory Study Center
27000021a Bucharest VIATA MILITARA in Romanian
Sep 87 p 12

[Interview with Colonel Gheorghe Tudor, head of Military History and Theory Study and Research Center, by Major Gheorghe Vartic: "A Strong Research Institution in the Sphere of Military History, Doctrine, Art, and Strategy"]

[Text] The establishment of the Military History and Theory Study and Research Center in 1969 was part of the general process of vigorous development of scientific research in Romania during the era inaugurated by the 9th Congress of the RCP.

[Question] Colonel Tudor, you are the head of this representative and prestigious institution of our army and a dedicated student of military history. Please tell the readers of this journal about the sphere of scientific study with which the center is currently concerned.

[Answer] The Military History and Theory Study and Research Center (CSCITM), which is organically incorporated into the broad process of national creative scientific endeavor, is today a powerful research institution in the areas of military history, doctrine, art, and strategy. Its departments and sections are fully committed to completing basic research projects in the following areas: analysis and interpretation, in the light of the concept of the party and its secretary General, Nicolae Ceausescu, of the impressive military effort exerted by the people during its existence of more than 2 millennia to defend the national being and the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the land of our forefathers, and writing of fundamental studies on this basis; study and broadening of the party's concept of defense of the homeland by all the people, development of ways and means of applying the principles of the national military doctrine brilliantly elaborated by the party secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu; study of social processes and phenomena in the army and utilization of the results in preparation of studies and research needed by decision making authorities to improve the activities of commands and large units; and investigation to determine the optimum methods of organization, preparation, and use of the forces of the national defense system at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in any war that might be imposed on Romania. The functional structure of our institution permits an interdisciplinary approach to priority objectives, integration of the entire scientific potential in a concentrated and coordinated effort for completion of all scheduled research projects.

[Question] What is your evaluation of the contribution made by scientific research to studies of military history, doctrine, and the military art, and of its impact on optimization of the instructional and educational process in the army?

[Answer] In addition to increasing efforts to ensure full and high-quality implementation of the research plan, the CSCITM engages in intensive activities at command headquarters and in large and small units. Participation by research personnel of our institution in the process of instruction and education in the army represents one of the institute's basic missions. Such personnel are constantly active in organized scientific meetings, presenting studies and papers, both at the army level and at command headquarters and in large units, in application exercises and cadre training exercises in the educational system, and at the Military Academy or at command headquarters. In this way we achieve efficient combination of research activities with educational activities and with practical instruction and education of the troops. We have obtained productive results in the area of military sociology as a result of broad studies conducted in troop units. Many studies and articles prepared by the departments and sections of the institution are published in military periodicals, and a number works have appeared in print under the sponsorship of the Editura Militara [Military Publishing House], representing true guides for the activities of army cadres.

[Question] The Military History and Theory Study and Research Center has unquestionably now become a distinct, remarkable force in the scientific life of the country. Would you care to comment on this?

[Answer] Responding to the assignment of a mission of high patriotic responsibility to the Romanian history writing community by the party secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, starting in 1984 our institution began work to finalize the basic project in its current activities, writing of the Treatise on the Military History of the Romanian People, a broad and significant synthesis of the enormous political and military effort exerted by the Romanian people throughout its continuing existence extending over more than 2 millennia in the Carpathian-Danubian-Black Sea area. An essential contribution to the publication of this monumental work has been made by its chief coordinator, Lieutenant General Dr Ilie Ceausescu, chairman of the Romanian Military History Commission. A distinguished group of military and civilian historians made up of eminent personages in Romanian historical culture have written and edited the first three volumes, which are to be published in 1989. I can now inform the reading public that the 4th volume is already at the printer's, and the 5th volume is being made ready for publication. Also published under the auspices of the Romanian Military History Commission and the CSCITM are the two volumes of the monograph "Romania in anii primului razboi mondial" [Romania

During World War I], and the three-volume work "Romania in anii celui de-al doilea razboi mondial" [Romania During World War II] will make its appearance in 1989. I may also point out that since 1984 the Romanian Military Commission has been publishing the Romanian military history journal LUPTA INTREGULUI POPOR [Battle of All the People], a publication praised by the reading public. The Romanian version of the journal has reached its 13th issue, and the English edition its 4th.

[Question] Please tell us, Colonel, about the international scientific activities of the CSCITM.

[Answer] Romanian military historians have been in the vanguard of Romanian historical research, presenting bulletins and reports at international scientific meetings and the 5-year congresses of world historians. They have attended the Congresses held in San Francisco (1975), Bucharest (1980), and Stuttgart (1985), as well as the annual colloquia of the International Military History Commission, where they have presented reports and papers on the most important and fundamental problems in the history of our people. Under the international "Changing Society" program completed in 1986, Romanian military historians presented a series of reports on the history of the Romanians, the majority of which have been published by the eminent publishing house Columbia University Press in New York. One of the conferences under this broad program was organized

in Bucharest in 1984 by the Romanian Military History Commission. The presence of Romanian specialists at international meetings and the exchanges of experience and books are forms used by us in the process of disseminating abroad the truth about the history of our country, of counteracting with the arguments offered by the science of history the false, denigrating theses concerning the historical development of the Romanian people still being advanced by certain hostile circles abroad. A large number of books have been and continue to be published in languages widely used internationally on the history of the Romanian people and the principles of its defense doctrine, which is based on battle by the entire people. Translations of the work "200 zile mai devreme. Rolul Romaniei in scurtaarea celui de-al doilea razboi mondial" [200 Days Earlier. Romania's Role in Shortening World War II] have appeared in Belgium and the United States. An extensive publishing program is now in progress in India in which a prominent place is occupied by the president of socialist Romania, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, and the Indian-Romanian Association of Historical Sciences was established this year. The Military History and Theory Study and Research Center and the Romanian Military History Commission are deeply involved in international scientific activities, along with other research and educational institutions in Romania.

6115

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Rostock Expands Container Infrastructure

23000021b East Berlin SEEWIRTSCHAFT in German
No 10, Oct 87 p 476

[Text] Since Jun 87, the Port of Rostock has had improved facilities for handling containers at Pier 61 on the Warnowkai. A second container-handling crane was placed in service on the 680-ft long dock. Both of the container cranes, built by VEB Loading- and Transport Equipment "Paul Froehlich" in Leipzig, have a lift capacity of 32 metric tons and a lift height of 120 ft.

The crane can reach a lift speed of 2 ft/sec with a container or other heavy loads, it can travel almost 1,200 ft along the dock and can transfer 32 containers an hour in double-duty (loading containers both on and off).

13071

Barge Traffic Increasing

23000021c East Berlin SEEWIRTSCHAFT in German
No 10, Oct 87 p 476

[Text] With a transported volume of over two million metric tons, the workers of the barge transport service of the GDR have matched the previous highest monthly performance. They exceeded the best daily performance, which was just set in May 87, and managed an increase of 160,000 metric tons over the same monthly reporting period in the past year. The approx. 9000 workers of the Barge Transport and Waterways Combine added these accomplishments to their excellent performance in the supplying of the capital with fuel and construction material in the first quarter of the year under the hardest winter weather conditions, and to their service in securing the high-water levee system. Since the beginning of the year 1987, 300,000 metric tons of freight was moved off of the highways and the rails and onto water.

The ships' crews of the VEB Barge Lines took advantage of not only the favorable water levels in the Elbe, but above all the advantages of modern transport technologies such as scheduled 24-hour service on selected river-canal segments, which is combined with an accelerated fleet cycle. The cargo and ship dispatchers also played a great role, as they succeeded in working with the customers in better utilizing the ship holds and in further reducing the number of empty runs. They were assisted in that effort by the inland port loading crews and the efforts of the dockworkers in securing fleet technical preparedness. Also of assist were the workers in the canal operations, who guaranteed safe shipping conditions and uninterrupted operation of the locks.

13071

Third Large Ferry Added to GDR-USSR Route

23000021a East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 4 Nov 87 p 1

[Text] The rail freight ferry "Vilnius," with its first load of cargo on board, sailed into the port of Mukran on Ruegen Island yesterday under the Soviet flag. The third large ferry assigned to freight traffic between the GDR and the USSR on the Mukran-Klaipeda route was delivered to the Soviet Union by the Mathias-Thesen Shipyard in Wismar last Friday (30 Oct). With the addition of the modern ferry which can carry over a hundred freight rail cars, the capacity of the transportation connection will be further increased. Over one hundred million metric tons of cargo has been carried on the ferries between the the GDR and the USSR.

13071

HUNGARY

Restructuring at Soviet Enterprise Affects Hungarian Partners

25000046a Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian
26 Nov 87 p 5

[Interview with Ferenc Martin, product manager of the Ikarus Bus Factory by Hanna Szalay: "What Have We Got To Do with Likino? Following the Tracks of an Ikarus Venture"]

[Text] In the city of Likino—located near Moscow—a restructuring effort has been under way with Hungarian participation, a slowdown in which was purported to have been one of the causes of a work stoppage that occurred a couple of months ago; this, at least, is what some of the strikers interviewed have claimed. To what extent does their side of the story reflect the facts, and where does the restructuring of the Likino Bus Factory stand now? These were the questions we have put to Ferenc Martin, product manager of Ikarus.

[Answer] The use of the word "strike" is already an exaggeration. What we had was an isolated incident, a one-time work stoppage. In reality, the main cause must have been a drop by a third and even a quarter in the workers' earnings following the quality inspection and subsequent acceptance by the state. It used to be that if a bus was able to roll out the factory gates it was already counted toward the fulfillment of the plan together with all of the beneficial consequences (bonuses) that accomplishment entailed. The inspectors of "gospriyomka," however, have set strict parameters for inspecting the buses. Consequently, a great many more have been found to be defective; hence the declining outputs and smaller bonuses which since have gradually disappeared altogether. It was against this background that the theory placing the blame on the delays in restructuring has been "fabricated," said Ferenc Martin, adding that he had visited the factory several times since the summer and found no disruptions in production.

A Year of Inaction

[Question] Still it is true that the restructuring effort has been hampered by delays, is it not?

[Answer] Yes, it is. In connection with the restructuring, however, we need to point out a few more things. It was in 1982 that—as part of the plans to switch over to the production of a new type of city bus—Ikarus had been called upon to restructure its operation. More specifically, it had been asked to supply and adapt production technologies and equipment. As originally envisioned the restructuring was supposed to be concluded by 31 December 1987. Ikarus had completed its preliminary plans for the restructuring by the agreed upon deadline; however, it was not until after a year of inaction, in September 1984, that we signed the contract with the Soviet foreign trade enterprise Avtopromimport, covering a whole spectrum of intellectual export activities.

[Question] Was the deadline kept unchanged?

[Answer] Yes.

Hindering Factors

[Question] Why did you enter into this deal in the first place?

[Answer] First of all, because we felt honored to have been sought out, i.e., by the fact that Ikarus' technology was considered to be worthy of adoption. Secondly, because it coincided with Ikarus' centrally supported effort to expand its product-oriented operation into the area of full-scale systems exports (intellectual exports). Thirdly, the venture had been viewed as potentially profitable, which since has been clearly confirmed. Besides, cooperation with the Soviet automobile industry has always been in our interest, and this particular example of cooperation has been quite edifying for Ikarus.

[Question] Does Ikarus not create competition for itself by doing this?

[Answer] No. Presently Likino produces more than 10,000 city buses per year. The restructuring will not affect the volume of production, only—it is hoped—its quality.

[Question] How close to completion would you say the restructuring at Likino is at this point?

[Answer] As I said earlier, we had signed a contract in 1984, and begun submitting the technological documentation in 1985; two-thirds of this effort has been completed. The delivery of Hungarian machinery and equipment began in 1986. The first of these units were installed this year, and we are currently in the process of laying the foundations for the first assembly lines.

The rate of completion, however, has been hampered by several factors of which the greatest problem has been the unavailability of needed production spheres. Significant changes have been made, furthermore, in the proposed design of the new bus and our recommended composition of the machine park. And finally, the process has been further hindered by a request announced by the buyer at the time of finalizing the specific technology to be employed for one which it considered superior to what Ikarus had to offer.

We Shall Remain Partners

[Question] Is it not to Ikarus' benefit to have to respond to higher demands?

[Answer] We have not always found specifically worded requirements to be economically justified. In a couple of instances we have even expressed our doubts regarding their feasibility. Now, however, there are signs that the restructuring has begun to accelerate. This has been further confirmed by our recent talks with the Soviet Ministry of Auto Industry, and the negotiations between the leaders of the Likino bus factory and Ikarus, where we coordinated our methods and the new deadlines of our continued cooperation. We want to remain full partners in this project which is not easy given the fact that we must deal with several subcontractors.

9379

Hope of Individual Participation in Corporate Ventures Raised

25000039a Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
15 Oct 87 p 23

[Article: "The Eagerly Awaited LTD Company"]

[Text] Starting 1 January 1988, private persons will either be allowed to join limited liability companies or not. In other words, there was very little encouragement and even less certainty in what Dr. Gabor Komaromi, deputy head of department of the Ministry of Justice was able to tell his audience called together by the Budapest branch of KIOSZ [National Organization of Artisans]. The briefing was still useful in that now everybody knows what to root for.

There is a consensus among lawyers, economists, today's small entrepreneurs who have been adversely affected by special taxes, and large enterprises whose aim is not to take advantage of, but to cooperate with small businesses, that private persons and unincorporated private partnerships (economic work collectives) to form LTD companies or to join already existing ones. With some minor changes and adjustments our existing statutory provisions could also be made to apply to them. Proponents of the idea believe that the concept could be made

more attractive to everyone if—as the current regulations require—they could be adequately circumvallated with regulations protecting the creditor, first of all by specifying the minimum amount of capital required to join.

The classical, internationally recognized LTD company more closely resembles an enterprise than an economic work collective. Although, unlike the corporation, the LTD company is a more personal form of cooperation (and in this respect it does resemble the economic work collective), it has only a few members who all know one another, and whose names are listed in the company directory together with information about when they joined, how much they have invested and how big a share of the business they own. It is a personal type of partnership in that the only way to quit it is with the consent of the other members who must also give their approval before any new members can be allowed to join. Upon joining, members are required to commit relatively large amounts of capital to the venture, and the minimum base capital required to form a LTD company is spelled out in a statutory provision. (In Hungary today, this amount has been set at 500,000 forints.)

The role of the founders in the day-to-day activities of a LTD company, however, is not quite the same as it is in the case of the economic work collectives. The statutory provision governing it provides a kind of framework that allows the contracting parties considerable latitude in determining and dividing up their functions; however, the members are owners first and entrepreneurs only second (in terms of actually running the business). Decisions of a strategic nature, such as the election of managing bodies, the sharing of profits, the admission of new members and the dissolution of the company are all decided by the membership meeting. The responsibility for running and maintaining operational control of the business rests with the business manager, who incidentally is also elected by the membership (who occasionally elect one or two business managers from their own ranks). The business manager, or manager, is controlled by the general meeting, or the control committee elected by the membership. The members may also decide to share the responsibility of running the business with the manager. It is the membership that decides the scope of authority and decision-making rights of the business manager(s). (For example, they may establish a value limit beyond which they have no authority to enter into business agreements, etc.)

What will determine whether or not this form of business will become accessible to those who today are still excluded from consideration? If the decision makers refuse to consider the work required by the LTD company of its members (which unquestionably can also be performed in addition to work performed elsewhere) as personal work, and choose to insist on adhering to the traditional interpretation of personal labor, then this possibility cannot be realistically expected to open up in

1988, and even if it does it will only be faintly reminiscent of anything sensible. The same will be the case if, fearing the specter of exploitation (which in the early 1980's was a frequently used argument against small businesses), they should decide to drastically reduce the number of employees private businesses are now allowed to hire, or if suddenly frightened by the idea of having enterprises formed by private persons they were to cut the size of LTD companies made up (also) of private members to a less than practical level (which given the present format has been set at 30 people by the experts).

One alternative would be to establish limited liability economic work collectives with a corporate status. (Corporate status means the legal separation of property and organization.) Even today's unincorporated entities could be allowed to participate in this form. Even after having agreed to work out the unbelievable number of new statutory provisions it would take to bring this about, legal experts do not promise that they will be able to bring such a deformed legal entity to life.

If the decision of the Presidential Council, which is expected to be made public at the end of December, chooses to endorse this latter form, then next year when the partnership law comes up for review we will once again have reason to hope...

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Further Disturbances in Consumer Goods Supply Feared

25000038a Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 29 Oct 87 p 3

[Report on the 28 October meeting of the Parliament's Commerce Committee: "Enterprise Tactics May Aggravate the Disturbance of Consumer Goods Supply"]

[Text] The Parliament's Commerce Committee yesterday discussed a number of topics, including the domestic commerce law, the effects of last year's changes in laws governing private commerce, and the situation and future of profit-making business organizations having the character of commercial enterprises. Before taking up the agenda, Committee Chairman Rezso Nyers presented the 1988 economic forecast. One may assume that enterprises are raising prices in order to offset the unfavorable effects of various newly introduced taxes. For the same reason it may be expected that the enterprises will play tactical games with inventories, which, in turn, may cause disturbances in merchandise supply. Aware of taxation and related matters, small entrepreneurs manifest a sense of insecurity. The rate of economic decline has slowed down, nevertheless this relative improvement took place and continues to take place at the expense of domestic market conditions. Consistency on the part of the government must be reinforced, and this also applies to the liquidation of inefficient enterprises.

Deputy Minister for Domestic Commerce Ferenc Spilak discussed recent changes in market processes, and mentioned the increased demand for high-priced items, and in particular for construction materials. Spilak also reported on actions taken in the interest of increasing base inventories. He stressed that the basic food and consumable industrial products supply is satisfactory, even if there is a stepped up demand in the coming weeks. It was recommended that prices going into effect 1 January be announced as soon as possible. An early announcement would permit families to plan their purchases in the coming months, and also the commercial sector could have a better idea of what size inventories they maintain. Three representatives (Mrs Attila Toth—Budapest, Kocsard Vida—Somogy County, and Jozsef Polgardi—Pest County) inquired why the commercial sector failed to anticipate the stepped up demand, and why the inventories are not being taken away from private merchants who bought up the available supplies. Spilak responded by saying that the system governing the purchase of certain construction materials, such as bricks, tiles and reinforced concrete rafters, virtually excludes the possibility of buying up supplies. The system is tied to an advance payment to be made at a Fuel and Building Material Trading Enterprise [TUZEP] depot, the subsequent issuance of a voucher by TUZEP, and the pickup of materials at a factory in lieu of the TUZEP voucher. At best it would be the factory clerk who oversees the exchange of the voucher and delivers the goods purchased, who could collude with someone in buying up the vouchers. Each year, including this year, private merchants are obligated to prepare an inventory. Aside from this, the Ministry of Domestic Commerce has indicated already in March that increased demand for certain products may be anticipated. The Ministry once again called attention to the growing demand in September, based on August statistics.

National Free Organization of Retailers [KISOSZ] President Erno Szilkovacs discussed the future of private commerce. The number of private merchants and employees had doubled during the past five years, while the number of workers employed by state, and cooperative commercial undertakings has declined. As of last July there were 33,450 private merchants in Hungary. Including family members and employees, more than 58,000 persons worked for the private commercial sector. In the villages one finds 10,500 private merchants; this includes 5000 new mercantile ventures initiated in

recent years. During the first half of this year there appears to have occurred a market adjustment: fewer people applied for permits, and the distribution of permits among trades has changed. There are fewer applications for the opening of boutiques and stores selling industrial goods. More incentives are needed to attract private merchants to do business in commercially undeveloped areas.

Representative Imre Kiss of Borsod County described the practical outcome of changes in legal provisions affecting domestic commerce, and queried whether merchants doing business under the new system of interestness has improved consumer supplies, or if the volume of goods sold remained unchanged, except for variations in brand names. Representative Imre Szabo (Hajdu-Bihar County) told the Committee that his County lacked funds to support the opening of stores on Sundays. He inquired how the Sunday opening of stores is accomplished in Budapest. Committee secretary Karoly Hellner (Budapest) analyzed the practical impact of changes in the domestic commerce law, and in particular compared the scope of the actually delegated authority with the scope of the actual authority exercised by councils. He called attention to the fact that in Hungary the number of cars is slowly approaching the 2 million mark, and that the monopolistic situation of the car dealership cannot be sustained much longer. Mrs Jozsef Nagy (Heves County) spoke about business ethics and the opportunity available to councils for the exercise of control. National Federation of Cooperatives [SZO-VOSZ] Deputy Executive Secretary Pal Szilvasan stated that regulations alone will not improve the flow of supplies. A more colorful commercial life can be accomplished only by changing the industrial background supportive of commerce, and by permitting real market conditions to evolve. According to Representative Sandor Csipko (Bacs-Kiskun County), one-third of all control actions unveils violations of law. The reason for most violations may be found in low wages. Representative Vida repeatedly stressed that in regards to contractually leased shops, a failure to review contracts through a competitive bidding process once every five years would necessarily lead to corruption.

Szilkovics and Spilak responded to the representatives' remarks.

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